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Contractual duress, unconstitutional conditions, and blackmail have long
been puzzling. The puzzle is why these doctrines sometimes condemn threatening
lawful action to induce agreements but sometimes do not. This Article provides a
general solution to this puzzle. Such threats are (and should be) deemed unlawfully
coercive only when they are contrived, meaning that the threatened action would
not have occurred if no threat could have been made. I show that such contrived
threats can be credible because making the threat strongly influences whether the
threatened action occurs. When such threats are uncontrived warnings, meaning
that the threatened action would have occurred even if no threat could have been
made, they are not coercive and can only benefit the agreeing parties. However,
sometimes (as with blackmail) agreements produced by uncontrived warnings are
also unlawful on the ground that they harm third parties. The contrived-threat test
explains why the Medicaid-defunding threat in the Affordable Care Act was
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unconstitutional. It also explains why the recent King v Burwell conclusion—that
the Affordable Care Act does not withhold tax credits from states that do not create
insurance exchanges—would have been constitutionally required even if it had not
been required by the statutory text.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 (ACA) with one notable exception: it struck down the provision that threatened to
remove preexisting federal Medicaid funding from states that refused to accept an expansion of Medicaid, on the ground that
this threat “crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from
coercion.”2 This constitutional standard has been condemned as
amorphous and meaningless.3 Because the standard explicitly
incorporates contract-law concepts,4 we might hope to find clear
guidance in the underlying contract law. But contract law makes
the legality of threats that induce contractual agreements turn
on whether the threats are “improper” or in “bad faith,” conclusory labels that themselves have been deemed incoherent and
meaningless.5 Nor could the Court find useful guidance from the
general unconstitutional-conditions doctrine because it has been
deemed conclusory, incoherent, and “infamously inadequate.”6
1

Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566, 2603,
2606 (2012) (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality) (“NFIB”); id at 2661–62
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
3
See id at 2641 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Sotomayor); Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, and Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 BU L Rev 1, 88 (2013).
4
See NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2602 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality); id
at 2659–60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
5
See Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex L Rev 717,
752–53, 779 (2005) (finding that contract law has failed to “produc[e] a coherent jurisprudence of coercion”); Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC:
Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 Iowa L Rev 849, 862, 875–78 (1979).
6
Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J
1311, 1350 (2002). See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv
2
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Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to have given up even trying to
define a coherent doctrine, openly admitting both in the Medicaiddefunding-threat case and a subsequent unconstitutionalconditions case that it could not articulate the line dividing constitutional conditions from unconstitutional ones, although it
was nonetheless—somehow—confident that the conditions it
was considering were over the line.7 This Article solves these
doctrinal puzzles with a coherent theory that is normatively attractive and descriptively fits current legal results.
For analytical clarity, it is important to exclude some cases
that lie outside these puzzles. If a threatened action by a government or private party were independently unconstitutional
or illegal, there would be no difficulty condemning the threat.
Likewise, sometimes even an uncoerced agreement to a condition or contract would be independently illegal or unconstitutional, usually because it would harm third parties or violate
equal protection norms. In these cases, the independent doctrine
of illegality or unconstitutionality does all the work.
Other times, whether the agreement was coerced is irrelevant because the threatener has a power to compel without any
agreement, such as when the government has a power to order
the relevant action because the individual or state has no constitutional right against such compulsion. Whenever direct coercion is permissible, that fact moots the issue of when threats of
otherwise-lawful action should be deemed coercive, because they
would be permissible either way. But in these cases the work is
done by the independent legal doctrines that create a power to
coerce.
The cases of interest involve situations in which a threat to
engage in otherwise-lawful action (like a termination of funding)
induces an agreement that is otherwise lawful, but the threat is
nonetheless deemed too coercive to enforce the induced agreement. Those threats are the ones for which we could use some
coherent principle to explain why they are sometimes condemned and sometimes allowed.
This Article provides a simple principle for resolving this
puzzle. It begins, in Part I, by resolving the underlying confusion
L Rev 1413, 1428 (1989) (finding that “the Court’s unconstitutional conditions rulings
display serious inconsistencies in their account of coercion”).
7
See NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2606 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality); id
at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting); Agency for International Development v Alliance for Open Society International, Inc, 133 S Ct 2321, 2330 (2013).
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in contract law about duress and contract modifications. I submit that this confusion can be resolved with the following simple
principle: a threat to engage in otherwise-lawful action that induces contract modification is unlawfully coercive only when the
threat is contrived, meaning that the threatened action would
not have occurred if no threat could have been made.
The essence of the normative justification can easily be
summarized. When a threat is not contrived, any legal prohibition that prevented the party from communicating the threat
would, by definition, result in the threatened action. Moreover,
because the threat, if made, would have induced the contract
modification, both sides must, by definition, have thought that
they were better off with the contract modification than with the
threatened action. Deterring these threats would harm both
parties. In such cases, communicating the planned action is less
a threat than an uncontrived warning of what is coming, which
gives the parties an opportunity to agree on an alternative that
makes them both better off.
In contrast, when the threat is contrived, preventing the
threat would not result in the threatened action, and the parties
would stick to the initial contract. Preventing such a contrived
threat would clearly leave the threat recipient better off because
he prefers the preexisting contract. Ex post, preventing the contrived threat would leave the threatener worse off because she
prefers the modification that the threat could have induced. But
if the modification raises total value for both parties, a threat is
unnecessary to achieve that modification because it could be
achieved with a bonus that shares the joint gain. If, in contrast,
the modification would reduce total value, then the prospect of
such welfare-reducing threats would (if they were allowed) be
priced into the contract and reduce reliance on the contract in a
way that would harm both parties. Moreover, sometimes a contrived threat will not succeed in inducing contract modification
and will then be carried out, which will leave both parties worse
off than if the preexisting contract had continued. An ability to
make such threats might also result in the other side making
welfare-reducing threats of its own. Thus, ex ante, both parties
would be better off preventing contrived threats.
The distinction between contrived threats and uncontrived
warnings turns only on whether, in a no-threat world, the
threatened action would have occurred. It does not turn on the
wording of the communication. Nor does it require inquiry into
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the threatener’s purpose. The threatener may have the benign
purpose of making the threat recipient better off, but the issue
here presumes that the threat recipient begins with a legal autonomy right to make his own choices free of coercion by others,
however well-intentioned that coercion may be. A threatening
government may not even have a collective purpose, but such a
purpose is unnecessary because what matters is what the government would have actually done without the threat. To be
sure, the lack of any reason to take the threatened action in a
no-threat world provides powerful evidence that the threatened
action would not have occurred in that world. In that sense,
purpose may sometimes be relevant to determining what would
have happened, but the ultimate test is solely what would have
happened without the threat, which need not require inquiry into purpose.
The contrived nature of a threat should also be distinguished from the threat’s credibility. A threat is credible if, postthreat, the threatener would carry out the threatened action if
the threat recipient did not agree. A threat is uncontrived if, in a
no-threat world, the threatener would have taken that action
anyway. The two differ because making a threat can strongly influence whether the threatened action occurs. As detailed below,
a contrived threat to engage in unprofitable action can be credible when done in stages, as in the usual contracts case in which
performance is withheld day by day, because the victim’s refusal
to modify at each stage is itself not credible, so that the threat is
expected to result in profitable modification. Making a contrived
threat can also change the emotional calculus or create reputational effects that make persons carry out the threat, even
though they would not have taken the action in a no-threat
world. Indeed, a credibility test has circularity problems when
such reputational effects exist, because whether a threat is credible can depend on whether the induced agreement is enforceable.
Persons or governments may also take steps to make their contrived threats more credible, such as incurring commitments,
debts, or costs that make carrying out the threatened action
more likely. When those steps would not have been taken absent
an ability to communicate the threat, the credible threat remains contrived.
A contrived threat is thus not the same as a bluff, because
contrived threats are often credible. Nor are contrived threats
harmless when they are bluffs. Bluffs can be very effective in
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coercing agreements when the victim is mistaken or even just
unsure about the credibility of the threat. Indeed, if the bluff induced the victim to accept an adverse modification, it must have
appeared credible enough to the victim. Nor is harm avoided
when the victim rejects a modification. If a victim does so because he wrongly perceived that the threat was not credible, the
threat will be carried out, harming both parties. If a victim does
so because he correctly perceived that the threat was not credible, the threat will not be carried out but will still have created
unnecessary conflict and negotiation costs. It is thus always better to deter a contrived threat from being made (by eliminating
any possible gain from it), regardless of how credible the threat
might have been or seemed.
My distinction between contrived threats and uncontrived
warnings is related to, but different from, distinctions between
threats and warnings that have been drawn by Professor Robert
Nozick, Professor Thomas Schelling, and others.8 Whereas my
definition turns on a pure but-for prediction, Nozick and other
philosophers define threats in a way that combines moral and
prediction baselines, which, as I show below, not only muddles
the results but also perversely leads to more immoral conduct.
Schelling and others use a prediction baseline—but one that is
based on a pre-threat baseline rather than my no-threat baseline—and Schelling draws no normative conclusions about
threats but rather focuses on analyzing their credibility.
Legally, an important benefit of using a contrived-threat
test is not only that it is normatively desirable but also that, as
Part I shows, the contrived-threat test descriptively explains
many features and conclusions of contract law, whereas scholars
who advocate a credibility test acknowledge that their test bears
no relationship to existing contract law. Under contract law, a
modification without mutual consideration is unenforceable if
induced by a contrived threat, and a modification with mutual
consideration is unenforceable if induced by a contrived threat to
take action that would leave the victim significantly worse off.
I then show, in Part II, that the contrived-threat test also
explains the Medicaid-defunding-threat case and provides a
general, desirable solution to the problem of unconstitutional
conditions. When a threat is contrived, the government benefit
would have been provided in the but-for world without that
8

See Part I.F.1.
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condition, and thus the threat to withhold the benefit penalizes
the exercise of a constitutional right. When the threat is uncontrived, the government benefit would not have been provided in
that but-for world, and thus withholding the benefit imposes no
penalty. Some constitutional law scholarship going back to Professor Seth Kreimer has, following Nozick, included a similar
prediction baseline but (like Nozick) combined it with other
baselines in a way that I show both confuses and worsens the
results.9 My contrived-threat test also shows that even if it had
been textually plausible to interpret the ACA to deny federal tax
credits to states that declined to create health insurance exchanges, such an interpretation should have been rejected because that would be a contrived threat and thus unconstitutional.
Finally, Part III shows that the contrived-threat test also
explains and justifies current legal treatment of threats that induce private parties to enter into new contracts. It also solves
the blackmail puzzle, showing that all blackmail contracts are
necessarily produced by either (1) contrived threats, which create inefficiencies for the contracting parties without affecting information disclosure, or (2) uncontrived warnings, which suppress the disclosure of information to third parties whose
interests often trump the interests of the contracting parties.
The combination is what explains and justifies the full scope of
blackmail law.
I. THREATS THAT INDUCE CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS
Whether a contract modification is enforceable turns on
whether the threat that induced it is improper or in bad faith.
Part I.A shows that, although those standards appear quite conclusory, the guidance about how to apply them is consistent with
deeming threats improper or in bad faith only when they are
contrived. Part I.B shows that a contrived-threat test also explains the pattern of case results in a normatively attractive
way. Part I.C provides a more general proof about the normative
desirability of a contrived-threat test. Part I.D shows that other
legal elements for making contract modifications unenforceable
can also be explained under a contrived-threat approach. Finally, Part I.E explains why a contrived-threat test is preferable to
the credible-threat test that is proposed by some leading scholars,

9

See notes 223–29.
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and Part I.F explains why a contrived-threat test is also preferable to various other tests suggested by scholars.
A.

Why Contract Standards Suggest a Contrived-Threat Test

For threats of otherwise-lawful action that induce contract
modifications, contract law has both a special rule and a more
general rule. The special rule applies only to modifications without mutual consideration, which increase the obligations of one
party without providing any fresh consideration for that change.
The more general duress rule applies to any threat that induces
contractual agreement. Although the general legal standards for
both are conclusory, the official guidance on them suggests a
contrived-threat test.
1. The special rule for modifications without mutual
consideration.
A threat to breach a contract that induces a modification
without mutual consideration is not binding unless the modification is (for a goods contract) in “good faith”10 or (for a nongoods
contract) “fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made.”11 Although
terms like “good faith” and “fair and equitable” are conclusory,
the law does provide guidance on the meaning of these terms.
For nongoods contracts, this guidance provides: “The limitation to a modification which is ‘fair and equitable’ . . . requires
an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification.”12
An objectively demonstrable reason provides an independent
reason to breach if no modification were possible, thus suggesting an uncontrived warning. The lack of any such reason would
instead suggest a likely contrived threat.
The unanticipated-circumstances element is often confused
with unforeseen circumstances, but that is not the correct test;
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes clear that the relevant unanticipated circumstances could be established by such
foreseeable events as a person being offered a higher price or incurring a 17 percent cost increase.13 This is consistent with a
contrived-threat test because such changes, though foreseeable,
10
11
12
13

UCC § 2-209, comment 2 (ALI 2014).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89(a) (1981).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b (1981).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b, illustrations 3–4 (1981).
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can often be the basis for an uncontrived warning if they make
breach profitable despite contract remedies. The Restatement
indicates that what it means by an unanticipated circumstance
is one that “was not adequately covered” by the contract, “even
though it was foreseen as a remote possibility.”14
“Unanticipated” thus means not specifically addressed by
the contract. This factor is quite relevant to judging whether a
threat is contrived, because if any changed circumstances were
already specifically addressed in the contract, then it seems unlikely that the change would have provoked a breach in a world
where no modification were possible. For example, suppose that
costs have increased by 17 percent, but the contract specifically
provides that if costs increase above 10 percent, the contract
price will increase by the cost increase plus a specified markup.
In that case, the parties have already determined what suffices
to induce performance under those circumstances, so a claim
that those circumstances would inevitably provoke breach seems
contrived. Threatening to breach because of a circumstance specifically anticipated by the contract thus seems likely to be a
contrived threat.
For goods contracts, the Uniform Commercial Code comments flesh out the “good faith” test by stating:
[T]he extortion of a “modification” without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good
faith. . . . The test of “good faith” . . . may in some situations
require an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a
modification. But such matters as a market shift which
makes performance come to involve a loss may provide such
a reason even though there is no such unforeseen difficulty as
would make out a legal excuse from performance.15
The reference to an “objectively demonstrable reason” again
suggests an uncontrived warning, and the last sentence confirms
that such a reason can exist even because of foreseen changes in
circumstances.
2. The general duress rule.
The general duress rule provides that any contract (including a new contract or modification with mutual consideration) is

14
15

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b (1981).
UCC § 2-209, comment 2 (ALI 2014).
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voidable when induced by (1) “an improper threat” that
(2) “leaves the victim no reasonable alternative” but to agree.16
At one time, the no-reasonable-alternative element referred
to conclusory, and somewhat mystical, notions of whether the
victim’s “free will” was overborne.17 However, contract law has
long rejected such notions and concluded that this element simply requires evidence that carrying out the threat would have
made the victim significantly worse off.18
The key normative work is thus done by the improperness
element, which standing alone is conclusory. But Restatement
§ 176 provides an extended definition of when a threat is improper. Some of the definition simply refers to threatened actions that are independently unlawful, which does not help with
the current issue.19 But other parts of the definition say that a
threat is improper if it is in bad faith, and the accompanying
comments indicate that is so when the threat lacks an “objectively demonstrable reason,” which, as the above shows, suggests a contrived threat.20 Even more helpfully, the Restatement
provides, “A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not
on fair terms, and . . . the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party making the
threat.”21 If a threatened act would not significantly benefit the
threatener, the party likely would not have taken the action if
unable to make the threat, thus indicating a contrived threat.
B.

How a Contrived-Threat Test Explains the Case Law
1. Cases of modifications without mutual consideration.

Consider first the renowned case of Alaska Packers’ Association v Domenico.22 A group of fishermen agreed in San Francisco
to take a boat to Alaska and fish in exchange for a company paying

16

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (1981).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175, comment b (1981).
18 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175, comment b (1981) (rejecting the
test that “the threat must arouse such fear as precludes a party from exercising free will
and judgment or that it must be such as would induce assent on the part of a brave man
or a man of ordinary firmness . . . because of [the test’s] vagueness and impracticability,”
and providing a series of examples making clear that no reasonable alternative exists
whenever the alternative would make the victim significantly worse off).
19 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(1)(a)–(c) (1981).
20 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(1)(d) & comment e (1981).
21 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2) (1981).
22 117 F 99 (9th Cir 1902).
17
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each fisherman $50 for the season plus 2 cents for each salmon
he caught.23 Once the fishermen were in Alaska, they threatened
to stop work entirely and return to San Francisco unless their
fixed pay was increased to $100.24 Although the fishermen
claimed that they threatened this because their nets were defective, the district court found otherwise, and the Ninth Circuit
determined that the threat to stop work was “without any valid
cause” and timed to take advantage of the fact that the company
could not get replacement fishermen to such a remote location in
time for the short fishing season.25 The company, which had also
invested $150,000 in a salmon cannery in Alaska, agreed to increase the fixed pay to $100.26 The court held that, under these
circumstances, this modification was unenforceable.27
Given these findings,28 the fishermen’s threat was clearly
contrived. The fishermen had no valid reason for threatening to
stop work, and doing so would not only deprive them of any
wages for the season but also require them to fund their travel
back to San Francisco and subject themselves to a risk of damages. There was thus no good reason to think that, if unable to
make this threat, the fishermen would have stopped working. If
contract law deters such threats from being made (by eliminating any gains from the modifications they induce), then the fishermen would have performed under the existing contract.
The lower court had upheld the modification because it concluded that it was mutually beneficial based on the company’s
consent, which indicated that the company must have decided
the modification was better than suing for breach of contract—

23

Id at 100.
Id at 100–01.
25 Id at 101–02 (stressing that the fishermen “willfully and arbitrarily broke” their
contractual obligation and noting the parallel to another case in which the threat to
breach was “unjustifiable”).
26 Alaska Packers’, 117 F at 100–01.
27 Id at 102–03. Although some read this case to adopt a flat rule that modifications
without mutual consideration are never enforceable, the court stressed that its holding
that mutual consideration was absent applied only “under such circumstances” and also
depended on the conclusion that any mutual waiver of the original contract was not “voluntary,” because the circumstances were like another case in which the threatener took
“an unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of the other party” by threatening nonperformance and thus “coerce[d]” the other party to increase the consideration it provided.
Id at 102, quoting King v Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co, 63 NW 1105, 1106 (Minn 1895).
28 Some have argued that the true facts were otherwise. See, for example, Bar-Gill
and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 757 (cited in note 5). But what matters for assessing the
legal standard is the conclusion that the found facts made the modification unenforceable.
24
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probably because the fishermen could not pay damages.29 The
problem with the lower court’s logic is that it wrongly assumes
that, absent any communicated threat, the fishermen would
have walked off the job. Instead, the findings indicate that they
would not have done so, and that their threat to do so was thus
contrived to extort the modification. A contract doctrine that deters such contrived threats from ever being communicated will
thus result in performance of the original contract. A contract
doctrine that instead made modifications produced by contrived
threats enforceable would encourage such contrived threats,
which would clearly make the company worse off because it prefers original contract performance to the modification.
Moreover, a contract doctrine that made modifications produced by contrived threats enforceable would also be bad for
fishermen ex ante. Switching to such a doctrine would encourage
contrived threats and modifications that would make the fishermen’s original promise to perform less valuable to the fish
company, and thus would make the fish company unwilling to
pay as much or to enter into the contract at all. To make itself
less vulnerable to such contrived threats, the company might also be less willing to make investments in reliance on the contract (like $150,000 for a cannery or spending to charter a boat),
which is ex ante bad for the fishermen because reducing those
investments reduces the productive value of their labor and thus
reduces what they can get paid.
In contrast, suppose that the facts had been different. Suppose that the fishermen threatened to stop work unless their
pay were increased to $100 because, once they got to Alaska, another firm offered to pay them $90. This would not be a contrived threat because, if unable to make this threat, the fishermen would (given their assumed inability to pay contract
damages) walk off the job for better pay, which would clearly
leave the fish company worse off than with the modification. It
would instead be an uncontrived warning of what would inevitably happen if no modification were possible. Deterring the modification induced by this uncontrived warning would be harmful
to both sides—without it, the fishermen would get $90 instead of
$100, and the fish company would be without fishermen.
But doesn’t this uncontrived warning still diminish the willingness of the fish company to pay as much in the original contract
29

Alaska Packers’, 117 F at 102.
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or to make investments that rely on it? Actually, no. The uncontrived warning allows a modification that makes the fish company better off than it would be if the fishermen walked off the
job, which is what would happen if no warning were given. Thus,
the possibility that uncontrived warnings would produce such
modifications actually increases the value of the contract and
encourages greater investment in relying on it. To be sure, the
prospect that the fishermen might independently want to walk
off the job (in a way that a contract damages action would not
fully compensate) does diminish the value of the contract and reliance on it. But if the warning is uncontrived, that prospect will
arise regardless; the ability to modify the contract when it arises
thus can only reduce the losses from that prospect.
Consistent with this conclusion, the Restatement indicates
that a modification increasing an employee’s pay for alreadycontracted performance would be binding if it came after an employee told his employer that he was abandoning the contract
because another firm had offered him more money.30 The Alaska
Packers’ court’s own reasoning likewise suggests that its result
would have been different if the threat to breach the contract
were made for a “valid cause,” which switching to a higherpaying firm would presumably supply.31 Indeed, Alaska Packers’
indicated no doubts about the enforceability of a prior modification without mutual consideration that increased the fixed pay
of many of the fishermen from $50 to $60 before they left San
Francisco.32 The fishermen would not have been able to induce
that change if the fish company could secure substitute fishermen for less than $60, which suggests that the market rate had
risen to $60 for these fishermen and that they would thus have
declined to get on the boat for Alaska if that modification were
not possible.
Likewise, if a party’s contract-performance costs have increased above expected costs by an amount sufficient to make
performance unprofitable, then modifications that pay it more

30 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, illustration 3 (1981). See also Schwartzreich
v Bauman-Basch, Inc, 131 NE 887, 890 (NY 1921). Although a threat to leave for higher
pay could be contrived if the pay increase were lower than the expected contract damages, the employee in Schwartzreich had simply announced he was leaving for higher pay
without demanding any modification, thus indicating that he would have left if no modification were possible. Id at 888.
31 Alaska Packers’, 117 F at 102.
32 Id at 100.
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for the same performance have generally been deemed binding.33
In such cases, threats not to perform are usually uncontrived
warnings because the party would likely walk away from the
unprofitable contract if unable to communicate any threat to do
so. This is not always so, because paying contract damages
might be even more unprofitable than performance. But the cases finding the modifications enforceable generally indicate that
the threatener was unwilling to perform at the contract price
(perhaps because the threatener rationally found the performance
cost worse than the risk of paying contract damages),34 which
would make the threat uncontrived.
If contract remedies left victims of breach just as well off as
they would be with contract performance (as expectation damages aspire to do), then threats to breach contracts could never
get threatened parties to agree to modifications that left them
worse off than with contract performance; they would instead reject the modifications and take the contract remedies.35 Undercompensatory contract remedies are thus necessary for a threat
to breach to lead to harmful modifications. But modifications
without fresh consideration by definition leave threatened parties worse off than they would be with contract performance. Accordingly, such nonmutual modifications indicate that contract
remedies must undercompensate threatened parties in some
way. This could be true for various reasons, including that expectation damages cannot be collected or that actual contract
remedies often provide less than full expectation damages. But
direct proof that contract remedies are undercompensatory is
unnecessary because one can infer undercompensatory remedies
from the nonmutual modification itself. So it is not surprising
that courts require no proof of undercompensatory remedies in
cases in which threats to breach induced nonmutual modifications. However, while undercompensatory contract remedies are
necessary for a threat to breach to lead to harmful modifications,
they are not sufficient: the threat to breach must also be contrived. Indeed, undercompensatory contract remedies are often
what lead to uncontrived warnings that a breach is coming. When

33

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, illustrations 1–2, 4 (1981).
See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, illustration 1 (1981);
Brian Construction and Development Co v Brighenti, 405 A2d 72, 74 (Conn 1978); Siebring
Manufacturing Co v Carlson Hybrid Corn Co, 70 NW2d 149, 151 (Iowa 1955); Goebel v
Linn, 11 NW 284, 284–85 (Mich 1882).
35 See Part I.D.1.
34
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that is the case, communicating the uncontrived warning can lead
to modifications that make both parties better off than the breach
that would occur if no warning could be communicated.
2. Cases of modifications with mutual consideration.
Consider now the famous case of Wolf v Marlton Corp.36 After contracting to buy a house in a housing development, the
buyers decided to divorce and wanted to escape the contract.37
They threatened that, unless the seller agreed to cancel the contract and return their security deposit, they would go ahead
with the purchase and deliberately resell the house to an undesirable purchaser, which would reduce property values in the
neighboring tracts owned by the seller.38 The court held that this
threat of economic harm overcame the free will of the seller but
could constitute duress only if the threat were also “wrongful.”39
The court acknowledged that the threatened action was perfectly lawful because the buyers had the legal right to resell to
whomever they wished, regardless of the economic effect on the
seller.40 However, the court concluded that it was nonetheless
wrongful when “a party for purely malicious and unconscionable
motives threatens to resell such a home to a purchaser, specially
selected because he would be undesirable, for the sole purpose of
injuring the builder’s business.”41 The Restatement likewise
makes clear that a threat to resell property to a purchaser that
will have adverse effects on surrounding land is improper only if
the threat is made “solely” to induce the contract modification.42
The court’s conclusion fits well with the theory that threats
are wrongful when they are contrived. If the threat to resell to a
purchaser specially selected to be undesirable was “purely malicious” and with the “sole purpose” of harming the seller’s business and inducing a modification,43 then there was no good reason to think that (if unable to communicate the threat) the
buyers would have limited their resale options to undesirable
purchasers. Limiting the set of potential purchasers would

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

154 A2d 625 (NJ Super App Div 1959).
Id at 626–27.
Id.
Id at 629, quoting Rubenstein v Rubenstein, 120 A2d 11, 15 (NJ 1956).
Wolf, 154 A2d at 630.
Id.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment e, illustration 10 (1981).
Wolf, 154 A2d at 630.
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naturally tend to lower the expected resale price, which would
harm the threatening buyers. Deterring the threat would thus
result in the original buyers making no special effort to seek out
undesirable purchasers. The threat was therefore contrived and,
accordingly, wrongful.
The Wolf court’s reasoning indicates that its holding would
have been different if the threat had not made for the sole purpose of harming the seller but was instead warning about coming action that would be independently beneficial for the threatening buyers. Suppose, for example, that the buyers had told the
seller they planned to resell to a registered child molester because he was willing to pay 10 percent over market price. In
that case, the communication would be an uncontrived warning
because, if unable to make this communication in order to negotiate a modification, the buyers would in fact resell to the child
molester, who was willing to pay the most. The seller would prefer to receive this warning because it enables the seller to negotiate a modification that makes the seller better off than he
would be without the warning.
The Wolf decision shows that threats can be contrived, and
thus improper, even if there is some probability that the threatened action would have occurred in a no-threat world. After all,
even if the home buyers made no special effort to resell the
house to an undesirable purchaser, there are presumably some
odds (call it X percent) that this would happen just from reselling to the highest bidder. Nonetheless, the threat to resell only
to an undesirable purchaser means the home buyers are threatening to increase those odds to 100 percent, which is still a contrived threat because the threatened action would not have occurred 100 – X percent of the time in a no-threat world.
Accordingly, a threat stated with certainty (as most threats are)
is contrived when the threatened action is actually a probabilistic
event.44 More generally, a threat that overstates the likelihood of
the threatened action is contrived.
In contrast, accurately stating the odds that the threatened
action would occur in the no-threat world would be an uncontrived warning. Suppose, for example, that the home buyers
were trying to resell their house and the bidding came down to
two bidders, one of whom was a registered child molester, and

44 Most threatened actions involve acts over which the threatener has control, so
most threatened actions are not probabilistic in this sense.
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that if no threat were communicated, the odds would be fifty–
fifty which bidder would win. If the home buyers were to accurately communicate those odds to the seller, then that would be
an uncontrived warning because the communication would not
overstate the odds that the threatened action would have occurred anyway. If the seller preferred the modification to those
fifty–fifty odds, then the seller would be better off knowing
about those odds and agreeing to the modification. If the communication were deterred, then the seller would be worse off
because he would suffer fifty–fifty odds that he would deem
worse than the modification.
The Wolf case also shows that threats that induce contract
modifications can be contrived, and thus improper, even though
no threat to breach the contract was made. In Wolf, the threat
was actually to perform the contract, but then to act in a particular manner afterward that was contrived.
Other cases involve threats to breach a contract that lead to
modifications with mutual consideration. A leading case is Austin
Instrument, Inc v Loral Corp.45 Austin had a contract to supply
gear parts to Loral to make radar sets for the Navy.46 When Loral
got a second Navy contract for radar sets, Loral told Austin it
would get a second contract only on those gear parts for which it
was the lowest bidder.47 Austin immediately said that it was opposed to supplying less than all gear parts on the second contract, and the next day Austin threatened to cease deliveries
under the first contract unless Loral not only ordered all gear
parts from Austin on the second contract but also gave Austin
substantial price increases on gear parts under the first contract, whether or not those gear parts were already delivered.48
Although the court focused on whether Loral had any reasonable
alternative, because that was the issue disputed on appeal, the
court made clear that duress also required a showing that the
threat was “wrongful.”49
Here the threat was properly deemed wrongful because the
threat to cease delivery was contrived.50 True, the lower court
45

272 NE2d 533 (NY 1971).
Id at 534.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Austin, 272 NE2d at 535.
50 Dicta in the opinion suggest that any threat to breach a contract is wrongful. Id.
The actual holding, however, is limited to the court’s factual findings, and the Restatement makes it crystal clear that “[a] threat by a party to a contract not to perform his
46
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noted that Austin claimed it was motivated by cost increases
that made supplying gear parts unprofitable,51 but the high
court’s statement of facts omitted this claim in a way that implicitly rejected it. Further, such a cost-based motive seemed
implausible given the facts that (1) the timing indicated that the
threat was motivated by a desire to supply all gear parts on the
second contract, rather than by cost increases; (2) cost increases
that make supplying gear parts unprofitable are not a likely motive for insisting on supplying more gear parts; and (3) a need to
cover costs on future supplies cannot explain the demand for
price increases on already-delivered gear parts. Thus, the facts
suggested that Austin would not have naturally ceased delivery
under the first contract, and that it threatened to do so only because making that threat would induce the desired contract
modification.
When cost increases do make contract performance highly
unprofitable, the Restatement concludes that it is permissible to
threaten to breach unless the price is increased.52 This conclusion is consistent with a contrived-threat test because such facts
suggest that the party would not perform even if there were no
prospect of inducing a modification, which would make the
threat an uncontrived warning.
When a threat to breach induces a nonmutual modification,
we can (as noted above) infer that contract remedies must be
undercompensatory, because otherwise the threatened party
would not have agreed to the modification. In contrast, we cannot make the same inference for modifications with mutual consideration, because it is possible that the return consideration
made the threatened party better off at the time of the modification. When threats to breach induce mutual modifications,
courts like the one in Austin often do require evidence that the
contract remedy is significantly undercompensatory.53

contractual duty is not, of itself, improper.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176,
comment e (1981).
51 Austin Instrument, Inc v Loral Corp, 316 NYS2d 528, 530 (NY App 1970). The
lower court did not confirm whether Austin’s costs had actually risen enough to make
performance unprofitable, but rather it simply noted that cost increases and renegotiations were common at the time. Id.
52 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, illustration 8 (1981).
53 See Austin, 272 NE2d at 535.
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A General Proof for the Contrived-Threat Test

Assume a threat is made to induce a contract modification.
Call the value of the initial contract Ct for the threatener and Cr
for the recipient of the threat. Call the value of the modified contract Mt for the threatener and Mr for the recipient. And call the
value of the situation if the threatened action were taken Tt for
the threatener and Tr for recipient.
We know that Mr > Tr, because otherwise the threat would
not induce modification. For modifications without mutual consideration, by definition Cr > Mr because the modification worsens
the deal for the recipient with zero offsetting benefits. Therefore,
Cr > Mr > Tr. For modifications with mutual consideration, it
may not be clear that Cr > Mr at the time of modification.54 But
the no-reasonable-alternative element of duress means that the
threatened action would leave the victim significantly worse off
than under the contract and thus means that Cr > Tr.55 Such a
threat would be necessary to induce modification only if the recipient preferred the contract to the modification, because if
Mr > Cr, the recipient would accept the offered modification
without any threat. So we can infer from such a threat that
Cr > Mr. Alternatively, direct proof might exist that Cr > Mr. Either way, contract-doctrine elements that are separate from the
“improperness” or “bad faith” of the threat establish that
Cr > Mr > Tr.
The threatener would not have sought the modification unless the threatener preferred the modification both to the contract (so Mt > Ct) and to the threatened action (so Mt > Tt).
However, further ranking has two possibilities that differ depending on whether the threatener prefers the contract to taking the threatened action. One possibility is that Mt > Tt > Ct.
In this case, the threat is uncontrived because taking the
threatened action would make the threatener better off than she
would be under the contract. The other possibility is that
Mt > Ct > Tt. In this case, the threat is contrived because taking
the threatened action would make the threatener worse off than
she would be under the contract.

54 When a threat recipient opposes modification enforcement, we know that
Cr > Mr at the time of litigation, but that valuation could reflect changes in costs or
market prices since the time of modification.
55 See Part I.D.1.
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1. Uncontrived warnings.
If Mt > Tt > Ct and the law prevents the threat and thus the
modification, then the threatened action will occur because it
makes the threatener better off than sticking to the contract.
Preventing the threat and modification would thus make both
parties worse off because they would both prefer the modification to the situation with the threatened action (that is, Mr > Tr
and Mt > Tt). The threat is thus an uncontrived warning of what
is inevitably coming unless the parties agree to a mutually beneficial alternative.
True, such an uncontrived threat will induce a modification
that is less valuable to the recipient than the contract. Thus,
relative to contract performance, the prospect of modifications
might seem to reduce the contract’s initial value to the recipient.
But contract performance is the wrong baseline because, without
the uncontrived threat and modification, the victim would instead suffer the threatened action, the prospect of which would
reduce the contract’s initial value to the recipient even more. Accordingly, relative to the correct but-for baseline of the threatened action occurring, the prospect of allowing modifications
when uncontrived warnings are made will raise the contract’s
initial value to the threat recipient, making the recipient willing
to give contract terms that are more favorable to the threatener
and to make more relationship-specific investments, both of
which will also raise the contract’s initial value to the threatener. Both parties are thus better off if such uncontrived warnings
are allowed to induce contract modifications.
2. Contrived threats.
If Mt > Ct > Tt and the law prevents the threat and the
modification, then the threatened action would not occur, because taking the threatened action would leave the threatener
worse off than under the contract. The original contract will
thus be performed. Preventing such a contrived threat would
thus clearly leave the recipient better off because Cr > Mr. That
may suffice if the normative goal of duress/modification doctrine
is simply to protect the recipient.
Further, ex ante, preventing contrived threats will also be
preferable to the threatener, and thus both parties would benefit
from a contract doctrine that prevented contrived threats. True,
ex post, preventing such a contrived threat would leave the
threatener worse off because Mt > Ct. But ex ante, the prospect
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of contrived threats will be priced into the contract and affect
the extent of reliance on that contract. To evaluate those effects,
consider the following three possible consequences of a contrived
threat.
a) Contrived threats that induce modifications that reduce
joint welfare. One variation is that a contrived threat might induce a modification that lowers the total combined value for the
parties, which means that Cr + Ct > Mr + Mt. In that case, not
only would the modification lower joint welfare, but also the prospect of such modifications would lower the contract’s initial
value to the recipient, leading the recipient to demand better
terms and make fewer relationship-specific investments, both of
which lower the contract’s initial value to both the threatener
and the threat recipient. Further, the potential threatener
would know that the recipient could make his own threats of
this nature, which would leave both the threatener and the recipient worse off. In short, such welfare-reducing threats will be
priced into the contract, deter reliance on the contract in a way
that harms both parties, and be used against both sides, so that
ex ante both parties would be better off preventing such threats.
b) Contrived threats that induce modifications that increase joint welfare. The other variation is that the modification
increases total joint value because the modification’s benefit to
the threatener exceeds its harm to the recipient. In that case,
Mt – Ct > Cr – Mr. But then the threatener does not need to
make a threat to induce the modification. The threatener could
instead obtain the same modification by offering a bonus B
that exceeds the recipient’s harm (Cr – Mr) but is lower than
the threatener’s benefit from the modification (Mt – Ct), so
that Mt – Ct > B > Cr – Mr. In short, if the modification increases joint welfare, it can be achieved without making any threat
(of Tr < Mr < Cr) by instead offering a bonus that shares the
joint gains between the two parties so that Mr + B > Cr. Thus,
preventing contrived threats is never necessary for threats that
enhance joint welfare.
c) Contrived threats that induce no modification. The final possibility is that a contrived threat fails to induce a modification, perhaps because the recipient did not perceive it to be
credible. If the recipient is mistaken in his perception, then the
threat will be carried out, which makes both sides worse off because Cr > Tr and Ct > Tt. If the recipient is correct in his
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perception, then the contract will continue, but the parties will
have incurred unnecessary costs of conflict and negotiation.
d) Overall effect of banning all contrived threats. In
short, preventing all contrived threats will prevent some modifications that reduce joint welfare, will never prevent modifications
that increase joint welfare, and will prevent some contrived
threats from being carried out to the detriment of both parties.
Thus, banning all contrived threats leaves both parties better off
ex ante, without any need to examine the welfare effects of the
modification.
One might wonder whether we should also prevent uncontrived warnings because they, too, can never be necessary for
modifications that enhance joint welfare relative to contract performance. The reason we should not is that, although uncontrived
warnings can indeed produce modifications that lower joint welfare relative to contract performance, without the uncontrived
warnings we would not get contract performance. Instead, we
would get the threatened action, and the induced modification
does enhance welfare for both parties relative to the situation
with that threatened action.
In short, to assess the effects of a threat/warning, we must
compare those effects to a but-for baseline that reflects the effects that would exist in the world but for the making of that
threat/warning. For a contrived threat, the effects are negative
because the but-for baseline is contract performance, which
gives higher joint value than any modification that requires
such a threat. For an uncontrived warning, the effects are positive because the but-for baseline is a threatened act that gives
both parties lower value than the modification does.
D. Other Legal Elements
1. No reasonable alternative.
The above analysis establishes that whether a threat is legally improper should turn on whether it is contrived. For any
threat to induce modification, it must be the case that Mr > Tr.
For modifications without mutual consideration, by definition
Cr > Mr, and thus we know Cr > Mr > Tr. For modifications with
mutual consideration, duress doctrine also requires proving that
the threat recipient had “no reasonable alternative,” which
means that the threatened action would leave the recipient significantly worse off than under the contract and thus means
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that Cr > Tr.56 Because such a threat could be necessary only if
Cr > Mr, this element establishes that Cr > Mr > Tr. As I note in
Part I.C, this value ranking is a requisite factual premise to
show that the situation involved a true threat rather than a bonus. Alternatively, one might have direct evidence that Cr > Mr,
in which case we can infer that Cr > Tr because Mr > Tr.57 Direct
evidence that Cr is significantly greater than Mr should thus
suffice to satisfy the no-reasonable-alternative test.
Administrative grounds explain why the law requires a significant difference even though a small difference could result in
some small harm. In a world with costless, perfectly accurate adjudication, all contrived threats would be condemned even if the
harm were small. But we do not live in such a world. Sometimes
a court will mistakenly treat an uncontrived warning like a contrived threat. A significance threshold assures that the potential
harm is large enough to exceed both litigation costs and the
overdeterrence effects that can result from inevitable errors in
adjudicative fact-finding. The significance threshold thus reduces the overdeterrence of uncontrived warnings that might be
mistaken for contrived threats, but it does so at a cost of underdeterring contrived threats with small harms.
For modifications without mutual consideration, contract
law does not require proving the no-reasonable-alternative test.
This makes sense because, as the proof above shows, any modification without mutual consideration necessarily satisfies the
condition that Cr > Mr > Tr. Because this automatically follows,
litigation costs or errors in establishing this condition are likely
to be far lower than for modifications with mutual consideration.
If contract-law remedies fully satisfied the expectation
damages goal of putting the recipient in the same position as
contract performance would put him, a threat to breach a contract would mean Cr = Tr, and thus the necessary premise that
Cr > Tr could not be satisfied and a recipient would never agree
to a modification for which Cr > Mr. Accordingly, threats to
breach a contract can cause the relevant problem only when contract remedies are undercompensatory—which alas is often the
56

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(1) (1981).
Some argue that the no-reasonable-alternative test is unnecessary because the
recipient would never agree to the modification unless he had no reasonable alternative. See,
for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and the Economics of
Credible Threats, 33 J Legal Stud 391, 423 (2004). But that assumes the modification
was adverse to the recipient when it was made, which is not necessarily true for modifications with mutual consideration. See note 54.
57
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case given litigation costs and delays, uncertain adjudication, limited defendant assets, and doctrines that sometimes provide damages below expectation levels. For modifications without mutual
consideration, we know that Cr > Mr, so we can infer that legal
remedies must not have been fully compensatory, or else the recipient would not have agreed to the modification. For modifications
with mutual consideration, courts instead often require evidence
that the contract remedy is significantly undercompensatory.58
One might think that the underlying problem of inadequate
contract remedies indicates that the solution should be to increase contract remedies rather than to have doctrines that police modifications. However, that solution would not help when,
as in the Wolf case, the contrived threat is not a threat to breach
the contract. Moreover, even when the contrived threat is a threat
to breach, that solution may be undesirable or unattainable. Optimal contract remedies can only minimize the sum of underdeterrence and overdeterrence of breaches, thus making undercompensatory remedies inevitable in some cases. Nor will
increasing contract remedies help in cases in which the threatener lacks sufficient assets to pay the damages. In any event, to the
extent that actual contract remedies leave Cr > Tr, it remains
desirable to prevent modifications caused by contrived threats to
breach contracts. The fact that different contract remedies might
have deterred the threats to breach does not alter the desirability of voiding modifications induced by contrived threats that
are made, given actual contract remedies.
The fact that the problem of contrived threats to breach contracts arises only when there are inadequate contract remedies
also explains why, if preventing contrived threats is good for
both parties, the parties’ initial contracts do not simply prohibit
contrived threats. The answer is that the same inadequate contract remedies would also fail to deter a breach of any promise
not to make contrived threats. The only solution to that problem
is to make modifications produced by contrived threats unenforceable. This is a solution that only the courts can supply because contract law provides that contracting parties can always
agree to modify any contractual prohibition on modifications,
thus making contractual prohibitions on future modifications
unenforceable.59

58
59

See, for example, Austin, 272 NE2d at 535.
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311, comment a (1981).
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2. Lack of objectively demonstrable reason or significant
benefit.
The legal standards indicate that, in general, a threat is
improper and in bad faith unless there is an “objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification”60 or a “significant[ ] benefit”61 from the threatened action.62 While having a
demonstrable reason or motive for the threatened action suggests that the threat was uncontrived, one might wonder about
the requirement that the reason must be “objective” or must
produce some concrete benefit. Why shouldn’t a purely subjective reason, like anger or spite, count if that motive would have
dictated the threatened action even if no threat had been made?
Suppose the Alaska Packers’ fishermen and the Wolf divorcing home buyers were so angry about their situations that (even
if no modifications were possible) they would have taken the
threatened actions despite the fact that doing so would clearly
harm themselves financially. If so, refusing to enforce such modifications because those reasons were subjective would actually
harm the recipients if we were sure both that (a) these were the
facts and (b) the anger itself was not contrived.
What explains the rule requiring an objective reason or concrete benefit is that both those premises are untrue. First,
claims about anger are subjective and easy to fake. Nor would it
suffice to ascertain whether the anger was real; one would need
to quantify its subjective effect to determine whether it would
really outweigh the financial harm of taking the threatened action. This creates a proof problem not only in hard cases, but also as a systemic matter, because the proof problem could be artificially generated in every case.
Second, even if anger would genuinely motivate the threatened action, anger might itself be endogenous to the desire to create a commitment or reputation that can make contrived threats
more credible. Persons might work themselves into a lather because their anger makes it credible that they will carry out their
threats, but their anger itself might be contrived. Or they might
want a reputation for acting out of anger when they are crossed,
so that their contrived threats will be more effective. Either way,
anger itself can be contrived, and refusing to enforce modifications
60
61
62

UCC § 2-209, comment 2 (ALI 2014).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2)(a) (1981).
See Part I.A.
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induced by threats that were produced by contrived anger might
thus deter those threats from ever being made.
In short, in a world with costless, perfectly accurate adjudication, uncontrived warnings should be permissible even when
based on nonpecuniary motives. However, in the actual world, it
is hard to detect anger that is faked or contrived, so admitting
subjective motives would lead to significant underdeterrence of
contrived threats. To reduce this underdeterrence, contract law
thus has sound reasons to deem a threat improper (that is, contrived) unless the threatened action is supported by some objective
reason or concrete benefit other than inducing the modification,
although the necessary cost is to overdeter some genuine, emotional uncontrived warnings.
3. Unfair modification terms.
Another doctrinal issue is why contract law makes the fairness of the induced modification relevant to whether it should be
enforceable.63 Given the proof above, one might think that any
contrived threat necessarily induces harmful modification and
that any uncontrived warning induces beneficial modification, so
that any separate inquiry into the fairness of the resulting modification seems unnecessary.
However, there is a sound reason for this requirement. Even
though the refusal to perform a contract may be an uncontrived
warning, in that the threatener would prefer nonperformance if
no modification were possible, a threat not to perform unless a
particular modification is granted may be contrived because a
lesser modification would have sufficed to induce performance.64
For example, a cost increase might make a party unwilling to
perform at the original contract price, but a threat not to perform unless given a price increase that vastly exceeds that cost
increase would still be a contrived threat because a smaller price
increase would suffice. Thus, to limit the threatener to the zone
of uncontrived warnings, the law must also police the fairness of
the demanded modification. This explanation provides concrete
content to what “fairness” means here—it means the modification

63

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 89, 176 (1981).
Consistent with this conclusion, the Restatement provides: “Bad faith may be
shown by proving that the person making the threat did not believe there was a reasonable
basis for the threatened process . . . or that he realized the demand he made was exorbitant.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment d (1981) (emphasis added).
64
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should not exceed the minimum that is necessary for the threatener to be willing to perform the original contract.
For example, a Restatement illustration indicates that despite a demonstrable increase in the market price for metal
needed to make castings, it would be improper to threaten to
withhold contractual supply of those castings unless the contract
price were increased from 50 cents to 75 cents, in a case in
which rivals sold the same castings for 55 cents but with several
months’ delay.65 Given the demonstrable cost increase, the
threat not to perform at the original contract price of 50 cents
could well be uncontrived, and other Restatement provisions
seem to treat such threats as proper.66 But the problem here is
that the threat was not to perform unless the price were increased to 75 cents, which does seem contrived because rivals
were willing to supply the castings at 55 cents despite the same
increase in market costs for metal. Thus, although a threat not
to perform unless the contract price were increased to 55 cents
could be an uncontrived warning, a threat not to perform unless
the contract price were increased to 75 cents would be a contrived threat.
E.

Why Not Instead Focus on Whether the Threat Is Credible?

Professors Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar argue that
contract modifications should always be enforced whenever they
are induced by credible threats or by noncredible threats that
are accurately perceived, limiting potential nonenforceability to
noncredible threats that are inaccurately perceived.67 Other
scholars reach a similar conclusion.68 Although their work is
highly illuminating, such a credible-threat test differs from a
contrived-threat test in important ways that make the latter
more desirable.
Whether a threat is contrived turns on a no-threat baseline:
If no threat could have been communicated, what would the
threatener have done? If she would have taken the threatened
action, then the threat is uncontrived; if she would not have,
then the threat is contrived. Whether a threat is credible instead
65

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b, illustration 5 (1981).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b, illustrations 1–2, 4 (1981).
67 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 392–94, 417 (cited in note 57);
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 717, 720, 727–28 (cited in note 5).
68 See Daniel A. Graham and Ellen R. Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic
Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, 52 L & Contemp Probs 9, 11–12, 23 (1989).
66
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turns on a post-threat baseline: After the threat is communicated, would the threatener actually carry it out if the modification
were rejected?69 If she would, then her threat is credible; if she
would not, then her threat is not credible.
This is a critical difference because the contrived-threat test
is designed to prevent such threats from being made in the first
place. A post-threat baseline instead assumes that the threat
would be made either way.70 The tests reach different results in
cases when, if no threat could be made, the threatener would not
take the threatened action, but if a threat were made, the
threatener would carry it out. In such cases, the threat is contrived but credible, and a credibility test would thus wrongly enforce any modification that it induced. In contrast, my contrivedthreat test would not enforce the induced modification, because
denying threateners any benefits from making such threats
would desirably deter such threats from ever being made.
1. Why contrived threats can be credible.
A contrived threat can be credible whenever the act of making the threat makes the threatener more likely to take the
threatened action if no modification is given. Making a threat
can have this effect for many reasons.
a) A contrived threat can be credible when staged. A contrived threat not to perform a contract is generally carried out in
stages that make it credible because the victim’s refusal to modify at each stage is itself not credible.71 Suppose, for example,
that withholding performance is unprofitable standing alone, so
that a onetime threat to never perform might not seem credible.

69 See Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 722 (cited in note 5) (“Credibility
is evaluated with an eye to the hypothetical temporal moment when the threat fails to
induce the threatened party to surrender.”); id at 742 (“Our analysis suggests that the
correct baseline . . . is not the position of the threatened party prior to the threat, but
rather the position that she would be in if she were to reject the threat.”); id at 742 n 51
(stressing that Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar are using a “post-threat baseline”).
70 See id at 742 (observing that Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s post-threat “position
takes the existence of a threat to be part of the unfortunate but relevant reality in which
the dilemma has to be resolved”).
71 Professor Lucian Arye Bebchuk established a similar point for threats to sue. See
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to
Sue, 25 J Legal Stud 1, 4–25 (1996). Threats of contract nonperformance are even more
credible than litigation threats because, while in Bebchuk’s model both sides incur equal
costs at each litigation stage, in the contract situation usually the victim immediately
incurs large costs from nonperformance while the threatener incurs costs only later if the
victim sues or does not pay.
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Nonetheless, a threatener usually withholds contract performance only one day at a time. The threat to continue doing so
each day is credible when a victim has no reasonable alternative, because each day the victim’s refusal to modify is not credible, given that the victim is harmed each day he refuses to modify. Moreover, the threatener usually suffers harm only later if
the victim sues or does not pay—possibilities that can be discounted because they would require the victim to follow through
with a noncredible threat to refuse modification. Thus, continuing to withhold performance, even though unprofitable standing
alone, can become profitable (and thus credible) because it is
expected to result in a profitable modification. In a sense, the
threat is credible each day because it creates a profitable reputation for credibility on following days.72
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge that such a staged
breach would be credible even though each stage is costly to the
threatener, but because they employ a credibility test, they
reach the mistaken conclusion that modifications induced by
such breaches should be enforceable.73 Their conclusion is mistaken because enforcing the modification encourages such contrived threats even though the prospect of them makes both parties worse off. A contrived-threat test instead correctly denies
enforcement of the modification because no stage of the threatened action would have occurred without the prospect of such a
modification, given that each stage of the threatened action is
unprofitable but for its ability to induce modification.
b) A contrived threat can be credible because it creates a
reputation for carrying out future threats. Once a threat is
made, failing to carry it out can have reputational effects for future threats. It can thus be credible that a threatener will carry
out a contrived threat (even though the threatened action is directly unprofitable) because the threatener profits from enhancing the credibility of her future threats.

72 The same theory works for more-violent threats. The loan shark need not resort
immediately to killing the nonpaying customer. Taking one finger off at a time can be
more effective. Even though carrying out each threat to amputate a finger is unprofitable
standing alone, it becomes profitable (and thus credible) because carrying out such a
threat is likely to convince the victim that other fingers will follow and thus induce him
to pay up.
73 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 417, 420–21 (cited in note 57) (concluding that any modification induced by a credible threat should be enforced and that
threatening such a staged breach is credible).

2016]

Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived Warnings

533

Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge not only that this
factor can make unprofitable threats credible, but also that it
creates an endogeneity problem for their approach, because it
means that whether a threat is credible can depend on whether
contract law enforces modifications induced by such threats.74
Suppose that carrying out a threat will reduce profits unless it
enhances a reputation for carrying out similar threats, which
will lead to future profitable modifications. If so, then the credibility of the threat turns entirely on whether contract law will
enforce such modifications. If contract law does, then the threat
is credible and the credibility test concludes that contract law
correctly enforces such modifications. If contract law does not,
then the threat is not credible and the credibility test concludes
that contract law correctly refuses to enforce such modifications.
Either conclusion is consistent with their test, which thus offers
no basis for choosing between them. In other words, because
their credibility test depends on whether contract law does enforce the threat, it cannot provide independent grounds to decide
whether contract law should enforce the threat.
Although Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar correctly conclude that
analysis should take this endogeneity problem into account,
their credibility test offers no answer to the question of which of
the endogenous solutions one should choose. The answer instead
depends on whether deterring the threat is desirable, which a
credibility test does not answer because credible threats can be
either contrived (and thus harmful) or uncontrived (and thus
beneficial).
A contrived-threat test, in contrast, avoids any endogeneity
problem. Contrived threats should make modifications unenforceable because in the no-threat world the threatened actions
would not occur. Thus, no reputation could be developed, and
profits from similar future modifications would be unavailable.
The contrived-threat test accordingly always provides a clear
conclusion that contract law should void modifications induced
by such contrived threats, no matter how credible they may be.
c) A contrived threat can be credible because making the
threat creates emotional benefits to carrying it out. Given human
nature, the mere act of making a threat can alter the psychic
benefits of carrying it out. A person who fails to carry out a
74 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 725–26 (cited in note 5) (noting that
“credibility is endogenous” because “the legal definition of duress is one of the factors
that can affect the credibility of the threat”).
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threat loses face and may feel obliged to live up to her threat.
Indeed, a threatener may develop a character for carrying out
her threats precisely because it makes her threats more credible
in ways that benefit her. Developing such a character can give
threateners psychic benefits from carrying out threats that
cause them to do so even when there are no future reputational
benefits.75
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge that emotional factors can make it credible to carry out an unprofitable threat.76
However, they do not consider the possibility that making the
threat can itself change the emotional calculus. A threat would
be contrived if, absent making any threat, the psychic benefits
would not suffice to take the unprofitable action. But making
this contrived threat can increase the psychic benefits from taking
that action in a way that offsets the lost profits and thus makes
the threat credible. Under the credibility test, this would make
modifications induced by such threats enforceable, which would
encourage such contrived threats because those modifications
would be profitable for the threatener. In contrast, under the
contrived-threat test, the threatener has no incentive to make
the threat in the first place given that any modification would be
unenforceable. The credibility test is thus less desirable, because
the proof above shows that such contrived threats can only harm
both parties.
d) A contrived threat can be credible because of efforts to
improve the threat’s credibility. Contrived threats can be made
in ways that create formal commitments to carry them out and
thus make them credible. Threateners might also take earlier
steps that increase the credibility of their contrived threats. For
example, if a threat to breach would be contrived because the
prospect of damages makes breach unprofitable, the threatener
could take on debt that reduces the expected amount she will
pay in damages. Alternatively, if a threat to breach would be
contrived because performance would be profitable, the threatener could take steps to increase her costs (or to fail to avoid

75 For example, a loan shark might find it advantageous to develop a character for
severely punishing nonpayment, and that character might thus cause him to carry out a
threat to kill someone who declines to pay, even though he hides the killing in a way that
means it can have no reputational effects.
76 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 726–27, 756–57 (cited in note 5). See
also generally Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an “Irrational” Breach
of Contract, 11 S Ct Econ Rev 143 (2004).
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such cost increases) in order to make performance unprofitable
and thus make a threat to breach credible.
Such efforts may ultimately make a threat credible and thus
make the modifications induced by it enforceable under a credibility test. If those modifications are sufficiently profitable to the
threatener, they can make such efforts worthwhile even though
the efforts would be unprofitable if the party were unable to
make the threat. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge that
this effect is both possible and undesirable, and they recommend
deviating from their credibility test when a party engages in
efforts to make her threat more credible.77 A contrived-threat
test would instead lead directly to the desirable conclusion because, absent an ability to make the threat, such unprofitable
efforts to make a threat more credible would not occur. Accordingly, without the ability to communicate such threats, neither
those contrived efforts nor the threatened actions would occur.
The threat is thus contrived and modifications induced by it
should be unenforceable.78
e) A contrived threat can be credible when there are low
odds of great harm. A contrived threat that is very unlikely to
be carried out can still be credible enough to induce agreement
given the magnitude of the threatened harm. For example, suppose that someone puts a gun to your head unless you agree to
modify a contract. Carrying out the threat harms the threatener
because pulling the trigger gets her nothing, incurs legal risks,
and costs a bullet. But suppose there are 1 percent odds that the
threatener will carry out the threat because of reputational effects or because she may be irrational, deranged, or on drugs.
Even if you accurately perceive those low odds, you would likely
consent to modification because a 1 percent risk of death exceeds
the harm from the modification. The threat can thus be credible
enough to induce modification even though it is clearly contrived. A contrived-threat test instead makes the modification
77 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 732–34 (cited in note 5); Bar-Gill and
Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 415–17 (cited in note 57). See also Mark Seidenfeld and
Murat C. Mungan, Duress as Rent-Seeking, 99 Minn L Rev 1423, 1427 (2015) (concluding
that credible threats should be deemed wrongful when the costs of making the threat
credible and carrying it out exceed the benefits of the threatened action).
78 Consistent with my conclusion, courts have interpreted the good faith requirement of a “legitimate commercial reason” to mean a reason “outside the control of the
party seeking the modification.” T & S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc v Pic-Air, Inc, 790
F2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir 1986). Thus, a party cannot bootstrap itself into a valid reason
for breaching by contrived efforts to incur costs, debts, or commitments that make performance unprofitable.
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void and thus eliminates any incentive to make the threat in the
first place. Enforcing such modifications would instead encourage such threats, which clearly seems undesirable.
2. Why contrived threats should be deterred even if they
are not credible.
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s theory also has problematic implications for noncredible threats. First, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar
conclude that modifications produced by noncredible threats
should also be enforceable whenever victims accurately perceived the noncredibility of the threat.79 They reason that, in
such cases, the threat could not have induced the modification.
Their approach thus limits the possible scope of duress doctrine
to noncredible threats that the victims wrongly perceived to be
credible.
Efforts to make contrived threats look credible are certainly
harmful. For example, a threatener might claim that her costs
or debts are higher than they are, suggesting that she is likely to
breach if no modification is obtained, even though breach is in
fact unprofitable.80 Such claims are directly policed by contract
doctrines that deem threats to be in bad faith when they are
dishonest in fact.81 However, as the preceding Section shows, a
contrived threat can be credible even if the threatener is completely honest about her situation, so contract law correctly also
deems threats to be in bad faith whenever they are unsupported
by objective reasons that would produce breach.
Nor is there any reason for the law to get into complicated
inquiries about whether a contrived threat was perceived to be
credible. We are always better off if such a contrived threat is
not made, rather than forcing the other side to guess about its
credibility. If the contrived threat induces an adverse modification, it must have been perceived to be credible enough. As noted
above, a threat can be credible enough even if the victim knows
the odds are very low that it will be carried out and even if fully
carrying out the threat is clearly unprofitable but it can be carried out in steps. Courts inquiring about victims’ perceptions
will often make errors, and may even suffer from hindsight bias,
79 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 393–94 (cited in note 57); Bar-Gill
and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 727–28, 730–31 (cited in note 5).
80 See Graham and Peirce, 52 L & Contemp Probs at 11, 23 (cited in note 68).
81 See, for example, Roth Steel Products v Sharon Steel Corp, 705 F2d 134, 146 (6th
Cir 1983).
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because courts will have access to information that the victims
do not have about the threats’ credibility.
Moreover, even a contrived threat that fails to induce modification is harmful. If the contrived threat fails to induce modification because the victim wrongly perceived that it was not credible, then the threat will be carried out, the prospect of which
harms both parties ex ante. If the contrived threat fails to induce modification because the victim correctly perceived that it
was not credible, then there is still no benefit to allowing the
threat; to the contrary, there is some harm because the threat
leads to unnecessary conflict and negotiation costs. Because contrived threats never have any benefit and can create great harm,
it is better for contract law to always deter them by eliminating
any potential profits from making them.
Second, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s approach produces no
theory about which of the noncredible threats that are wrongly
perceived to be credible should make induced modifications
voidable; instead, they conclude that this issue turns on normative considerations beyond their analysis.82 My analysis provides
a clearer conclusion: all modifications induced by contrived
threats should be void, whether or not those contrived threats
were credible.
3. The credibility test does not fit contract law.
A final advantage of the contrived-threat test is that it fits
well with existing contract-law results, explaining why contrived
threats are improper regardless of whether they will be carried
out. In contrast, as Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar acknowledge, their
theory conflicts with current contract law.83 Indeed, their insistence that credible threats should never void modifications directly conflicts with the no-reasonable-alternative element, because credible threats are the ones most likely to leave victims
with no reasonable alternatives. Their approach thus immunizes
the worst kind of contrived threat: a credible one that will be
carried out only because the threat was made. Current law also
82 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev at 744 (cited in note 5) (“While we argue
that whenever a threat is credible the deal should be enforced, we do not argue that
whenever a threat is not credible, the deal should not be enforced. . . . A normative theory . . . is necessary to determine which among these noncredible threats are coercive.”);
id at 731–32.
83 Id at 719, 721, 737, 753–54; Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Legal Stud at 392–94,
422–23 (cited in note 57).
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eschews any separate inquiry into whether a reasonable person
would have perceived the threat to be credible, concluding (as I
do) that it suffices if the threat actually induced the modification.84
F.

Comparing Other Proposed Tests
1. Professors Nozick and Schelling on threats versus
warnings.

My contrived-threat test is partly related to the distinction
that Nozick, Schelling, and others have drawn between impermissible “threats” on the one hand and permissible “offers” and
“warnings” on the other.85 Nozick’s analysis is particularly important because it has influenced legal scholarship on contractual duress and unconstitutional conditions. However, their distinctions and analyses differ from mine in various important
respects.
First, while I use a pure prediction baseline to measure
threats and warnings, Nozick and other philosophers combine a
prediction baseline with a moral baseline, and thus their test
condemns some “threats” that I would deem uncontrived warnings. Although Nozick defines an impermissible “threat” to exist
when the threatened conduct would leave the recipient worse off
than the expected course of events, he defines “expected” to
“straddle predicted and morally required.”86 Thus, his definition
of an impermissible threat includes adverse deviations not only
from what predictably would occur without any threat (which I
would call a contrived threat) but also from what is morally required, even though it conforms to what would predictably occur
without the threat (thus including what I deem uncontrived
warnings).87

84 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175, comment c (1981) (“[T]he question
is, did the threat actually induce assent on the part of the person claiming to be the victim of duress. . . . [I]t is not essential that a reasonable person would have believed that
the maker of the threat had the ability to execute it.”).
85 See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton
White, eds, Philosophy, Science, and Method 440, 447–58 (St Martin’s 1969); Thomas C.
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 123 n 5 (Harvard 1960).
86 Nozick, Coercion at 447, 450 (cited in note 85) (emphasis in original). Other
scholars likewise define threats by combining prediction and moral baselines. See, for
example, Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 206–21 (Princeton 1987); Scott Altman, Divorcing
Threats and Offers, 15 L & Phil 209, 211–15 (1996).
87 See, for example, Nozick, Coercion at 450 (cited in note 85).

2016]

Contrived Threats versus Uncontrived Warnings

539

One problem with Nozick’s definition is that he never defines what is “morally required” (which he equates with “morally
expected”), which adds a vague, conclusory element to his analysis.88 Indeed, the typical contract modification is induced by
threats to breach, which some might argue always deviate from
what is morally expected,89 a conclusion that would mean that
such threats are always impermissible and the modifications are
always voidable.90 This would conflict with current law and be
undesirable because the proof above shows that enforcing modifications induced by uncontrived “threats” is desirable.
No matter what he means by it, Nozick’s moral prong has
bite only when it deems threats impermissible even though the
threatened action conforms to the predicted course of events—
that is, only when it condemns uncontrived “threats.”91 The
above proof shows that this bite is undesirable. To be sure, such
uncontrived threats by supposition threaten action that deviates
from some (unspecified) moral norm, which makes them undesirable relative to compliance with that moral norm. But that
moral deviation will by definition occur if the law prevents
communication of uncontrived “threats” to take that deviant action. Thus, enforcing modifications induced by such uncontrived
“threats” to engage in immoral action will not only reduce such
immoral conduct but also leave both parties better off, given the
morally unacceptable conduct that would occur if such modifications could not be enforced.
The fact that the threatened immoral conduct would occur
may suggest that the underlying problem is that the law does
not sufficiently penalize that conduct. But the remedy for that is
increasing that penalty. If penalties are not sufficiently large to
deter the immoral conduct, banning uncontrived warnings about
that conduct will merely assure that the immoral conduct occurs
88 Id at 447, 450 (“In some such situations it will be unclear what P is morally expected to do, and hence unclear whether his statement is a threat or an offer.”).
89 See, for example, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and
Promise, 120 Harv L Rev 708, 730–33 (2007).
90 If a threat adversely deviates from what is morally expected but not from what is
predicted, Nozick suggests that the threat should be condemned whenever the victim
would prefer what is morally expected to what is predicted. Nozick, Coercion at 451 (cited in note 85). Thus, if performance were morally expected, Nozick would always condemn threats to breach because victims prefer contract performance over breach.
91 If a threat adversely deviates from what is predicted, Nozick condemns the
threat even if it does not deviate from what is morally required. Id at 453. Thus, the only
effect that his morally required prong can have is to condemn some threats that the predicted prong would not.
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instead of preferable modifications. Moreover, there are usually
good reasons why the law does not impose greater penalties on
immoral conduct, such as the fear that imprecision in application
of the law will also deter desirable conduct. Thus, even optimal
legal regulation will leave some immoral conduct undeterred, the
harm of which could be reduced by enforcing modifications induced by uncontrived warnings about that conduct.
Second, these scholars often use a different prediction baseline than I do. Although in parts Nozick uses the same no-threat
baseline as I do,92 in other parts he and other philosophers use a
pre-threat baseline that turns on what the victim would have
expected to occur before the threat was made.93 Given that nearly every person who receives a threat to breach a contract expects
contract performance before he hears about the threat, this prethreat expectation test would condemn all contract modifications
induced by a threat of breach. This would not only deviate from
actual contract law, but would also condemn desirable uncontrived warnings whenever the warnings were unexpected by the
victims. Deterring such unexpected warnings would thus increase
unexpected harm to the victims and prevent mutually desirable
modifications to avoid it. Schelling uses a different pre-threat
baseline to define a “warning,” which under his approach turns
on whether, immediately before making the threat, the threatener would have found it in her interest to take the threatened
action.94 Schelling’s definition of a warning would thus include
cases in which parties make contrived commitments that give
them independent incentives to take the threatened action,
which I note above should be condemned as contrived threats.95
Schelling also draws no normative conclusions about what he
calls threats because his work is instead about analyzing (quite
brilliantly) the credibility and effectiveness of threats.96
Third, Nozick concludes that contrived threats should be
deemed permissible “offers” when they induce agreements that
the recipient feels leave him better off than the predicted
course of events.97 That is, even if a contrived threat results in

92
93
94
95
96
97

Id at 453–57.
Id at 447–53. See also Wertheimer, Coercion at 207 (cited in note 86).
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict at 123 n 5 (cited in note 85).
See Part I.E.1.d.
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict at 121–23 (cited in note 85).
Nozick, Coercion at 448–49 (cited in note 85).
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Cr > Tr, Nozick concludes that it should count as a permissible
offer if Mr > Cr.
However, there is no benefit from creating a legal exception
for contrived threats that induce modifications that leave the recipient better off. If it were really true that Mr > Cr, then the
threatener could always induce the modification without any
contrived threat. Indeed, the fact that the threatener felt a
threat was needed suggests that she really believed Cr > Mr.
The best way to test whether the recipient really believed
Mr > Cr would be to prevent contrived threats that leave the recipient worse off than Cr. This preserves the recipient’s autonomy right to choose for himself whether he prefers the modification, rather than having that right turn on whether a court
concludes that the recipient really believes the modification
made him worse off.
Fourth, and related to all the above points, Nozick believes
that the distinction between impermissible threats and permissible offers or warnings is inescapably normative.98 Many other
scholars share this view.99 In my account, however, the distinction is purely factual: it turns solely on what, in a no-threat
world, the threatener would have done. This factual distinction
has, as I prove above, clear normative implications given the
consequences that flow from it. But the distinction is a factual
one that does not require independent normative criteria. That
is critical because we are dealing with threatened actions that
are otherwise lawful and thus by definition are within the
bounds in which contract law and constitutional law allow parties and governments to pursue their own normative goals.
2. Changed circumstances.
Other leading scholars conclude that the enforceability of
modifications should depend on the existence of various types of
changed circumstances. Although such changed circumstances
often correctly indicate an uncontrived warning that should lead
to enforceability, their tests are under- and overinclusive.

98

Id at 449.
See, for example, Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual
Obligation 95–99 (Harvard 1981); Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1446 n 133 (cited in note
6) (collecting sources).
99
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Professor Alan Schwartz concludes that modifications should
be enforceable when prompted by any changed circumstances.100
However, many changed circumstances will not even make performance unprofitable, let alone so unprofitable that threateners
would not perform even if modification were impossible. Unless the
changed circumstances have that effect, threats not to perform are
contrived threats despite changed circumstances, and enforcing
such modifications under Schwartz’s overinclusive test will thus
encourage contrived threats, with undesirable consequences.
Judge Richard Posner concludes that modifications should
be enforceable when changed circumstances make performance
by a willing party impossible without a modification.101 However,
even if performance is possible, it will not actually occur if
changed circumstances make performance less profitable than
breach. In such cases, the threat to breach is an uncontrived
warning and failing to enforce modifications under Posner’s underinclusive test will thus lead to breaches that both parties find
worse than modification.
Professor Varouj Aivazian, Professor Michael Trebilcock,
and Judge Michael Penny conclude that modifications should be
enforceable only when changed circumstances affect risks that
are remote and for which the threat recipients are superior risk
bearers.102 They reason that other modifications reallocate contractual risks away from superior risk bearers.103 However, even
when their test is not met, threateners would (if modification
were impossible) still breach when doing so would be more profitable than performance. When that is so, threats to breach are
uncontrived warnings, and their underinclusive test will prevent
desirable modifications. True, modifications induced by such
contrived warnings may, as they argue, reallocate risks in a way
that is less efficient than the original contracts.104 But if the
modifications are prevented, we will not get performance of the
original contracts. We will get breaches that all parties regard as
100 Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J Legal Stud 271, 312 (1992).
101 Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J Legal Stud
411, 421–22 (1977).
102 Varouj A. Aivazian, Michael J. Trebilcock, and Michael Penny, The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 Osgoode
Hall L J 173, 196–97 (1984).
103 See id at 193–94.
104 Id (arguing that because risks in a contract presumably “have been assigned to
the superior . . . risk bearer,” allowing a party to “reallocate [risk] to the other party by
contract modification” creates inefficiencies).
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worse than the modifications. Aivazian, Trebilcock, and Penny
worry that the prospect of risk reallocation through modification
will reduce threateners’ incentives to avoid risks that make
them want to breach.105 But the contrived-threat test eliminates
that concern by deeming threats contrived if nonperformance
became advantageous only because of changed circumstances
that resulted from contrived decisions that the threatener would
have found unprofitable but for the ability to make a threat that
induces modification.106
Professor Jason Johnston concludes that modifications
should be enforceable only when sought because changed circumstances made performance of the original contract unprofitable.107
Although such changes in circumstances often indicate an uncontrived warning, his test is both under- and overinclusive.
First, even if changed circumstances make performance of
the original contract unprofitable, sometimes the prospect of
paying expectation damages is even less profitable. In such situations, threats not to perform are contrived despite those
changed circumstances, and enforcing modifications under
Johnston’s test will encourage such contrived threats, with undesirable consequences. Thus, courts are right to require further
evidence that unprofitability really would have led to nonperformance even if no modification were possible.108
Second, even if changed circumstances do not make performance of the original contract unprofitable, threats not to perform may be uncontrived warnings. For example, suppose that
performing the contract remains profitable, but a third party
has offered a higher price that would be even more profitable.
Suppose further that the threatener prefers to take the higher
price (and risk contract damages) over performing the original
contract. If so, threats not to perform are uncontrived warnings,
and refusing to enforce modifications will thus undesirably lead
to breaches that make both parties worse off. Thus, contract law
is right to enforce modifications when a party would otherwise
take an even more profitable offer.109
105

Id at 194.
See Part I.E.1.d.
107 Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic
Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S Cal Interdisc L J 335,
339–41, 366, 375 (1993).
108 See note 34 and accompanying text.
109 See notes 30–32 and accompanying text. Posner would go even further and enforce
any modification if the threat to terminate were prompted by a third party offering a
106
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Third, even if changed circumstances make performance of
the original contract unprofitable, that may not justify modifications induced by contrived threats unrelated to performance.
For example, in Wolf, the buyers’ divorce was a changed circumstance that made performance unprofitable because they
consequently had to resell the house.110 However, their threat
was not to breach, but rather to complete the house purchase
and then resell to an undesirable purchaser, which was even
more unprofitable. That threat remained contrived, and thus the
court was correct not to enforce the modification.
II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
The preceding Part establishes that contract-law standards
correctly deem a threat invalidly coercive only if two elements
are both met: (1) the threat was contrived (and thus “improper”)
and (2) carrying out the threat would leave the victim significantly worse off (thus meaning that he had “no reasonable alternative” but to agree). This Part establishes that those same
two elements should and do apply to the unconstitutionalconditions doctrine. Part II.A establishes that those elements
explain the Spending Clause case law on unconstitutional conditions affecting states. Part II.B provides a general proof of the
normative desirability of the contrived-threat test and establishes that the same two elements explain the case law on unconstitutional conditions affecting private persons.
A.

Unconstitutional Conditions Affecting States

The Medicaid-defunding-threat decision follows straightforwardly from the above contractual analysis. As the Court has
noted, its Spending Clause precedents incorporate contract-law
standards on duress, viewing the relationship between the federal government and the states as contractual in nature.111 The
higher price. Posner, 6 J Legal Stud at 424 (cited in note 101). His position is overbroad
because such threats are uncontrived warnings only if the higher price would have led
to nonperformance (despite the risk of contract damages) even if no threat could be
communicated.
110 See Part I.B.2.
111 See note 4 and accompanying text. A key premise for the contractual characterization was that the federal government could not directly command states to accept the
Medicaid expansion. National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct
2566, 2602 (2012) (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality) (“NFIB”). If the federal government could do so, it would not matter whether the defunding threat was coercive, because coercion would be permissible.
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threat to defund Medicaid unless states accepted the Medicaid
expansion thus violated the relevant standard if it was the case
both that (1) the threat was contrived and (2) carrying out the
threat would have left the states significantly worse off.
1. Findings showing a contrived threat.
Much of Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion in National
Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius112 (“NFIB”) focused on the second element because it was important to distinguish some key precedent.113 But before doing so, he offered an
analysis that established that the first element was met by the
threat to take away preexisting Medicaid funds, stating:
[Proposition 1] The States claim that this threat serves no
purpose other than to force unwilling States to sign up for
the dramatic expansion in health care coverage effected by
the Act. Given the nature of the threat and the programs at
issue here, we must agree. [Proposition 2] We have upheld
Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of funds on the
States’ complying with restrictions on the use of those
funds, because that is the means by which Congress ensures
that the funds are spent according to its view of the ‘‘general
Welfare.’’ [Proposition 3] Conditions that do not here govern
the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that
basis. When, for example, such conditions take the form of
threats to terminate other significant independent grants,
the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring
the States to accept policy changes.114
Proposition 1 was a finding that the threat had “no purpose” but
to force states to accept the modification.115 This finding meant
the threat was contrived—that is, absent an ability to make the
threat, Congress would not have terminated preexisting Medicaid. Proposition 2 further indicates that threats are acceptable
when they reflect Congress’s view that the use of its funds advances the general welfare only if certain conditions are met.

112

132 S Ct 2566 (2012).
Id at 2604–05 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
114 Id at 2603–04 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality) (material in
brackets added).
115 Id at 2603 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). For a similar conclusion, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study
in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 Tex L Rev 1283, 1323, 1334–35 (2013).
113
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Such a congressional view would indicate that Congress would
find cutting off funding preferable to continuing it without conditions, which would make a threat to cut off funding an uncontrived warning of what Congress would do if attaching the condition were impossible. Proposition 3 concludes that this is not
the case when Congress threatens to terminate significant independent grants, which Congress would have no reason to discontinue but for the fact that the threat pressures states to agree to
a change, thus indicating a contrived threat.
The conclusion that the threat to eliminate preexisting
Medicaid funds was contrived seems entirely correct. There was
no evidence that any significant faction in Congress (let alone a
congressional majority) preferred eliminating Medicaid over
having preexisting Medicaid continue. The threat to defund
preexisting Medicaid was thus a contrived threat to engage in
action that Congress would not have engaged in if it were unable
to make the threat. Indeed, now that the Supreme Court has
prevented the Secretary of Health and Human Services from
threatening to eliminate Medicaid to induce states to accept the
Medicaid expansion,116 we have not seen any congressional
movement to eliminate Medicaid, even though Congress has gotten only more conservative since the Congress that enacted the
ACA.117 To put it another way, Congress’s clear preference ranking
was Medicaid Expansion > Preexisting Medicaid > No Medicaid.
If unable to impose Medicaid expansion, then Congress would
continue to provide preexisting Medicaid. Thus, the threat to instead eliminate preexisting Medicaid was a contrived threat that
penalized states’ choices not to accept the Medicaid expansion.
Indeed, Roberts explicitly confirmed that he thought the threat
was contrived when he concluded that, absent the condition,
“[p]ractical constraints would plainly inhibit, if not preclude, the
Federal Government from repealing the existing program.”118
Conversely, suppose that we lived in a different world where
Congress really thought that preexisting Medicaid was working
so poorly that the nation would be better off eliminating it rather than allowing it to continue, but also thought that the Medicaid expansion would be better than both options. That is, suppose its preference ranking were Medicaid Expansion > No
116

NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2608 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
See Holly Fechner, Managing Political Polarization in Congress: A Case Study on
the Use of the Hastert Rule, 2014 Utah L Rev 757, 761–62.
118 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2606 n 14 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
117
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Medicaid > Preexisting Medicaid. In that imaginary world, the
threat to eliminate Medicaid would be an uncontrived warning,
which would make it thus constitutional. In this situation, constitutionality would be desirable because if the law prevented
Congress from communicating such an uncontrived warning,
Congress would have eliminated Medicaid. By definition, that
would leave the states worse off because the states preferred agreeing to the Medicaid expansion to having Medicaid eliminated.
The actual case also involved an uncontrived warning that
the Court did sustain. Namely, the Court held that Congress
could threaten to withhold new Medicaid funds from states that
did not agree to the Medicaid expansion.119 That threat was an
uncontrived warning because the only reason Congress was willing to offer the new funds was to get the Medicaid expansion.
Thus, if Congress could not condition those new funds on the
states’ expansion of Medicaid, then Congress would not provide
the new funds at all. In other words, Congress’s preference ranking was Medicaid Expansion > Preexisting Medicaid > Additional Funding Without Medicaid Expansion. If Congress could not
threaten to withhold additional funding unless the states expanded Medicaid, this ranking means that Congress would just
provide states with preexisting Medicaid funding. That makes
the threat to withhold additional funding an uncontrived threat,
which the Court allowed. A contrary ruling would have removed
the option to choose Medicaid expansion with the new funds
over preexisting Medicaid, which would have made states that
preferred that option (as well as Congress) worse off.
Roberts again confirmed this analysis because he concluded
that while the threat to withhold new Medicaid funds was “offering” funds, the threat to deny existing Medicaid funds would
“penalize” states.120 This distinction would not make sense if he
were determining whether a threat was an offer or penalty relative to a baseline of what Congress legally could do, because
Congress could legally withhold either source of funds. But it
does make sense if we understand Roberts to be using a baseline
of what Congress would have done absent the condition.
Further confirmation was provided because Roberts’s analysis of Steward Machine Co v Davis121 concluded that the threat
there was constitutional for reasons that showed it was an
119
120
121

Id at 2607 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
Id (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
301 US 548 (1937).
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uncontrived warning.122 In Steward, Congress assessed a tax to
fund federal unemployment insurance, but it gave a tax credit to
employers who paid into state unemployment plans.123 The
Supreme Court held that the threat to withhold tax credits from
employers in states without unemployment plans did not coerce
states to adopt such plans.124 As Roberts correctly observed, that
holding rested on the premise that “Congress was willing to direct businesses to instead pay the money into state programs only on the condition that the money be used for the same purposes.”125 This premise meant that the threat to withhold tax credits
was an uncontrived warning because, if Congress had no ability
to obtain the condition, Congress would have provided no tax
credit rather than give unconditioned tax credits.
To put it another way, in Steward, Congress’s preference
ranking was Conditioned Tax Credits > No Tax Credits > Unconditioned Tax Credits. Thus, the threat to deny tax credits was
just an uncontrived warning of what would happen if tax credits
could not be conditioned on states’ provision of unemployment insurance. Prohibiting the conditioned tax credits would thus leave
the states who accepted them worse off because their acceptance
showed that they preferred the tax credits with conditions to no
tax credits at all. In other words, offering the conditioned tax
credits to states added an option that they might prefer to the
zero tax credits that they would otherwise get, rather than penalizing a choice not to adopt state unemployment insurance by
withholding unconditioned tax credits that would otherwise be
forthcoming. Accordingly, Steward correctly concluded that
Congress was using “temptation” (adding options preferable to
the but-for world) rather than “coercion” (imposing penalties
worse than the but-for world).126
The joint dissenting opinion in NFIB wrongly suggested in
dicta that the sole test of coercion was whether the noreasonable-alternative test was met.127 That test could condemn
uncontrived warnings about denials of funding or tax credits,
which would leave states worse off because the states would
then suffer those denials even when they preferred to agree to
122

NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2603 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
Steward, 301 US at 574–76.
124 Id at 585, 591.
125 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2603 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). See
also Steward, 301 US at 587–91.
126 Steward, 301 US at 589–90.
127 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2661 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
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the conditions necessary to avoid them. It would also deviate
from the underlying contract-law principles (which the joint
opinion agreed applied128) because those principles also require a
contrived (that is, improper) threat. However, this suggestion
was dicta because other parts of the joint opinion indicate that
the dissenting justices believed the actual congressional threat
to eliminate preexisting Medicaid was contrived, stating that
“Congress would surely” not want to leave our “most vulnerable
groups . . . out in the cold” by eliminating Medicaid in states
that did not accept the expansion.129 Because the actual threat
was contrived, eliminating the ability to make it would not (and
did not) result in a Medicaid elimination that would harm the
states. In any event, because the votes in the Roberts opinion
were necessary for the judgment, those votes limit the holding of
unconstitutionality to threats that not only leave states with no
reasonable choice but also are contrived.
South Dakota v Dole130 is not to the contrary. To be sure, one
might reasonably conclude that the threat in that case—to
withhold federal highway funding from states that did not ban
underage drinking131—was a contrived threat. But some Supreme Court language suggests that the Court did not think
so.132 More important, as stressed above, a threat can be invalidated as coercive only when it meets two elements: (1) the threat
must be contrived and (2) carrying out the threat must leave the
states significantly worse off (meaning that they had no reasonable alternative but to agree). Thus, even if the threat in Dole
were contrived, that threat could not be invalidated unless it also
met the second element, and Dole focused on the conclusion that
this second element was not met, as the next Section details.
2. The lack of a reasonable alternative.
The rest of Roberts’s analysis in NFIB established that the
second necessary element, the lack of a reasonable alternative,
128

Id at 2659–60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
Id at 2665 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
130 483 US 203 (1987).
131 Id at 205.
132 Roberts distinguished Dole because there the condition requiring a twenty-oneyear-old drinking age was directly related to Congress’s purpose in making sure that its
highway spending advanced safe interstate travel. NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2604 (Roberts,
joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). Such a purpose suggests that Congress might
prefer eliminating highway funding over funding highways on which underage drinkers
could drive. If so, then the threat in Dole was an uncontrived warning.
129
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was also met, finding that states had “no real option but to acquiesce” because eliminating federal Medicaid funding threatened a “loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget.”133
This finding confirms that (as under contract law) the Spending
Clause version of this element merely requires showing that
carrying out the threat would have left the victim significantly
worse off. Roberts distinguished Dole on the ground that there the
threat was to eliminate funding that was less than 0.5 percent of
the state’s budget.134 The opinion thus suggests that losing less
than 0.5 percent of a state’s budget does not leave it significantly
worse off, but that losing 10 percent of a state’s budget does.
As noted above in the discussion of the underlying contract
standards, where to draw the line on what counts as a significant difference turns on administrative grounds related both to
litigation costs and to concerns that inevitable inaccuracies in
adjudication (such as incorrectly finding a threat to be contrived)
might create overdeterrence problems.135 It thus makes sense to
limit the doctrine to cases with significant underdeterrence concerns; if carrying out a threat would leave states less than 0.5
percent worse off, then modifications induced by that threat
cannot harm states any more than that.
3. The critiques.
In NFIB, the Government argued that the threat was uncoercive because the Medicaid expansion was so generous that it
left the states better off.136 This parallels the Nozick argument
that I rejected above: that a contrived threat should be deemed a
permissible offer if it compels a party to accept an agreement
that makes it better off.137 As the joint dissent pointed out, if the
states really believed that the expansion left them better off,
then a threat to take away preexisting Medicaid funds would
have been unnecessary.138 The fact that (with the threat now
removed) many states have not accepted the Medicaid expansion139 confirms they must not actually prefer the expansion to
133

Id at 2604–05 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
Id at 2604 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
135 See Part I.D.1.
136 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2665–66 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
137 See text accompanying note 97.
138 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
139 See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Crafting a Narrative for the Red State Option, 102
Ky L J 381, 381 (2014) (noting that, as of one year after the NFIB opinion, “fourteen
states have rejected [Medicaid] expansion”).
134
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preexisting Medicaid. To be sure, many argue that this state
choice is financially irrational given the huge share of federal
funding for that expansion. But the legal premise for coercion
analysis is that states have a constitutional autonomy right to
choose for themselves whether to accept the Medicaid expansion,140
and in making autonomous choices, states are free to either assess
the financial implications differently or make decisions based on
reasons unrelated to finances. Sometimes we admire such decisions as standing on principle. To allow such contrived threats
when the federal government and courts believe the end result
makes the states better off, but the states do not, would violate
the posited constitutional autonomy right.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the threat could
not be coercive because Congress has the legal right to eliminate
Medicaid funding.141 But Spending Clause cases incorporate
contract-law principles, and her argument conflicts with the
contract-law principle that a threat to engage in otherwiselawful action can be coercive when it is contrived and leaves the
victim no reasonable choice but to agree.142 Her argument also
conflicts with the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, which
invalidates many threats to take action (like cutting off funding)
that is itself perfectly legal.143 These doctrines are correct because, no matter what Congress legally could do, a threat that
deviates from what Congress would do without the challenged
condition imposes a penalty on the state’s constitutional choice.
Ginsburg also argued that the threat was not coercive because ‘‘Congress [had] not threatened to withhold funds earmarked for any other program.’’144 Roberts disputed her premise,
concluding that preexisting Medicaid and the expansion were so
different that they were not “all one program.”145 How can we tell
whether programs are separate? The answer cannot turn, as
Roberts correctly concluded, on how Congress “styled” the
programs, because the whole point is to impose some limit on

140 See note 111. See also NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2601–02 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and
Kagan) (plurality).
141 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2630 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Sotomayor).
142 See Parts I, III.
143 See Part II.B.2.
144 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2634 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Sotomayor).
145 Id at 2605 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
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Congress’s power.146 The answer must instead depend on why it
functionally matters whether programs are separate. The reason it
matters is that, if the threatened cutoff concerns an independent
program, there is generally no reason to think that (absent linkage to the threat) Congress would have wanted to discontinue
that independent program, which means that the threat to do so
is likely contrived. Thus, whether preexisting Medicaid should
count as an independent program from the expansion turns not
on formalisms but on whether we think Congress would have
preferred to continue preexisting Medicaid in a world where it
could not be linked to the expansion. Because Congress clearly
would have preferred this, the two should count as separate
programs.
Ginsburg further claimed that the Court’s holding made no
sense because Congress could instead have first repealed Medicaid and then offered a new Medicaid with the expansion.147
However, her premise again conflicts with contract-law principles, which have long treated rescission and replacement as the
same as modification.148 Nor is her premise accurate, because
repealing Medicaid would still be a contrived threat if it would
not have occurred absent the prospect of inducing states to agree
to the expansion.149
Finally, Ginsburg argued that the threat was constitutional
because Congress and the states had already agreed that Congress could amend Medicaid, and the expansion was a foreseeable use of that power.150 This argument is quite different—it
claims that coercion does not matter because voluntary state
consent to the expansion was unnecessary, given that states had
already prospectively agreed to any amendment in their earlier
Medicaid contracts. This claim raises a different contract-law issue: When a contract gives one side unilateral power to amend a
contract, what are the limits on how that power can be exercised
without the other side’s consent? Roberts’s opinion that such a
unilateral power can be exercised to make only minor modifications is consistent with how contract law treats such provisions,
146

Id (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
Id at 2629, 2636 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Sotomayor).
148 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, comment b (1981).
149 After all, “a threat need not be verbally expressed; it may be perfectly clear from
actions performed what the threat is.” Nozick, Coercion at 444 (cited in note 85).
150 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2630, 2638–39 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Sotomayor).
147
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because without that implied limit the initial contract would
contain illusory promises and thus be too indefinite to enforce.151
This explains why past minor Medicaid modifications were permissible even when unilaterally imposed by Congress.
4. King v Burwell.152
In King v Burwell, the challengers argued that the ACA
should be interpreted to deny federal tax credits to states that did
not create their own health insurance exchanges.153 The Court
concluded that Chevron deference did not apply because of the
extraordinary-case exception.154 Because the IRS interpretation
was clearly contrary to the views of the current Congress, this
holding fits the pattern of the Court’s past cases, which have applied the extraordinary-case exception to Chevron deference if
and only if the agency interpretation conflicts with current congressional views on a politically important topic.155 As I have
shown before, this understanding of the extraordinary-case exception fits other evidence that the true basis of Chevron deference is, and should be, a current-preferences default rule that
applies only when the enacting legislature’s meaning is unclear
and the agency action is a good proxy for current enactable preferences.156 The Court then concluded that, when the relevant
provisions were read in context with other statutory language
and structure, the ACA did not threaten to deny federal tax
credits to states that refused to create insurance exchanges.157
But what if the statutory language had instead been ambiguous or (as the dissent argued) clearly did make such a threat?
Such a threat would clearly have been contrived because (if
making this threat were impossible) the enacting Congress surely would have preferred giving tax credits without this condition
over denying tax credits. After all, as every justice recognized in

151 Id at 2605–06 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2, comment e (1981); Samuel Williston, 1 A Treatise on
the Law of Contracts § 4:24 at 756 (Thomson/West 4th ed 2007) (Richard A. Lord, ed);
Joseph M. Perillo and Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, 2 Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 at 142
(West rev ed 1995).
152 135 S Ct 2480 (2015).
153 Id at 2487–88.
154 Id at 2488–89.
155 See Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation
101–07 (Harvard 2008) (showing this pattern in the case law).
156 See id.
157 King, 135 S Ct at 2489–96.
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NFIB, the overriding goal of the Congress that enacted the ACA
was universal insurance coverage.158 The ACA imposes on all
states community-rating and guaranteed-issue requirements
that would drive healthier persons out of individual insurance
markets unless coupled with both tax credits and mandates that
keep the individuals in.159 Because the ACA conditions the mandates to buy insurance on the federal tax credits received, withholding tax credits would also have lifted the mandates for nearly 87 percent of individuals in states that refused to create
exchanges.160 Withholding federal tax credits would thus have
caused a collapse of state insurance markets that would have
been precisely opposite to the congressional goal of universal
coverage.161 Indeed, it would have triggered a collapse of individual insurance markets below the levels that prevailed before the
ACA, which would have been contrary to the aims of even congressional opponents to the ACA.
The statutory threat that would have been created by the
challengers’ interpretation would also have satisfied the noreasonable-alternative element because carrying out the posited
threat would have left states significantly worse off. The direct financial harm alone would have been 6 percent of the average
state budget,162 twelve times the 0.5 percent in Dole and closer to
the 10 percent that NFIB held was way past the constitutional
line.163 Moreover, this financial harm would have been multiplied
because the threatened action would also have caused individual
insurance markets to collapse in the states that refused to establish their own exchanges. Not only would this have been harmful to their citizens and state economies (and thus to state tax
revenue), but in order to deal with all the newly uninsured,
these states “would almost certainly find it necessary to increase
158 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2606 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality); id at
2613 (Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Sotomayor, Breyer,
and Kagan); id at 2664–65 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
159 King, 135 S Ct at 2485–87, 2493.
160 Id at 2493.
161 Id at 2493–94, 2496.
162 Brief of Amici Curiae Jewish Alliance for Law & Social Action (JALSA), Jewish
Social Policy Action Network (JSPAN), Jewish Council on Urban Affairs (JCUA), Boston
Alliance for Community Health, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, and Professors of Health Law and Constitutional Law in Support of Respondents,
King v Burwell, Docket No 14-114, *9 (US filed Jan 26, 2015) (available on Westlaw at
2015 WL 350366).
163 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2605 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality); id at
2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
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[their] own health-care expenditures substantially,” and indeed
the states would have been legally obligated to fund the newly
uninsureds’ emergency care in state hospitals.164 The total harm
to states would surely have exceeded the 10 percent that NFIB
held was obviously unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the same principles that explain why the Court
was correct to hold the Medicaid-defunding threat unconstitutional show that interpreting the ACA to threaten to withhold
tax credits would have also made that tax credit threat unconstitutional. One might try to argue that the two cases differ because in King the posited threat would have pressured states
indirectly by withholding new tax credits from its citizens. But
that was precisely the form of threat at issue in Steward, which
held that the applicable legal standard to judge such threats
was the same legal standard that NFIB applied to the Medicaiddefunding threat.165 A holding that threats to deny new benefits
cannot be coercive would also conflict with the unconstitutionalconditions doctrine, which often condemns withholding new
benefits unless individuals waive their constitutional rights, and
with underlying contractual principles, which often condemn
threats to withhold new benefits to induce new contracts.166 In
any event, the posited threat in King would not have merely
withheld new benefits: given the associated regulation, it would
have threatened a collapse of individual insurance markets below levels that prevailed before the ACA.
Interpreting the ACA as threatening to withhold tax credits
would thus have conflicted with the canon requiring that statutes be interpreted to avoid constitutional invalidity. Indeed, as
Justice Anthony Kennedy correctly stated at oral argument, the
modern canon of constitutional avoidance requires avoiding any
interpretation that raises significant constitutional doubt or
complexities, which would certainly have been raised by interpreting the ACA to make the posited threat.167 Further, even if

164

Id at 2657, 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
Id at 2603–05 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality) (applying the
Steward “undue influence” standard); id at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
dissenting).
166 See Parts II.B.2, III. The correct baseline is a predictive baseline, not a historical
baseline, although history is sometimes relevant to prediction. See text accompanying
notes 227–28.
167 Transcript of Oral Argument, King v Burwell, Docket No 14-114, *16–18, 49 (US
Mar 4, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 2399405) (“King Transcript”). See also National Labor Relations Board v Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 US 490, 508–09 (1979).
165

556

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:503

one (in my view, incorrectly) concluded that the statute threatened to withhold tax credits so clearly that the canon of avoidance was inapplicable, that threat would have to be invalidated
as unconstitutional. Some have argued that the remedy for
such unconstitutionality is unclear, but the routine remedy for
unconstitutional conditions has always been voiding the condition, not denying the government benefit to everyone.168 The
contrived-threat test explains why: such conditions are unconstitutional only when the threat was contrived, which by definition means that (if unable to impose the condition) the enacting
legislature would have preferred granting the benefit over withholding it. This same legislative preference ranking means that
statutory default rules on severability, which require severing
the statute in a way that is most likely to advance the enacting
legislature’s preferences, would have required voiding the threat
to withhold benefits, rather than voiding the grant of benefits
for everyone.169

168 That was true both in NFIB and in all the cases considered in Part II.B.2. When,
for example, the Court held it unconstitutional to withhold a tax exemption from veterans
who refused to give a loyalty oath, the remedy was to give the tax exemption to all veterans, not to deny it to all veterans. See Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 527–29, 531 (1958).
169 See Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules at 133–34 (cited in note 155). The dissenting
justices simply ignored the fact that their interpretation would have resulted in a tax credit
threat that was unconstitutional under their own interpretation of the unconstitutionalcoercion doctrine in NFIB. But one of the dissenting justices, Justice Antonin Scalia, suggested at oral argument that his view was that no prior case had ever held that the
Court could “rewrite” a statute when a clear provision was held unconstitutional. King
Transcript at *17 (cited in note 167). However, no such rewrite would have been required: the condition “by the State” could simply have been voided in the provisions that
calculate tax credits based on premiums and coverage months in an “[e]xchange established by the State.” 26 USC § 36B(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i). This would have involved, if anything, less “rewriting” than voiding the language that created the unconstitutional Medicaiddefunding threat. In any event, Scalia was mistaken in his claim that no prior case has
ever held that a rewrite was the appropriate approach. In United States v Booker, 543
US 220 (2005), which held that mandatory sentencing guidelines without jury factfinding were unconstitutional, the Court stressed that severability analysis does not require simply grammatically separating the invalid terms, but rather requires choosing
the option that Congress would have most preferred, and it noted that this sometimes
requires “modification of a statutory provision,” which the Court did by making the
guidelines advisory. Id at 246–49. Scalia himself acknowledged that this decision required “rewriting” the statute. Id at 284–85 (Stevens dissenting in part, joined by Souter
and Scalia). Moreover, Scalia favored a different interpretation that would have “rewritten” the statute as well: namely, adding jury fact-finding to the sentencing process on the
ground that Congress would have preferred that instead. Id at 246 (pointing out that the
dissent, joined in relevant part by Scalia, required the “addition” of provisions requiring
jury fact-finding); id at 303–04 (Scalia dissenting in part).
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Unconstitutional Conditions Affecting Private Persons
1. A general proof.

Unconstitutional-conditions cases involve situations in
which the government has the power to deny a benefit and persons have a constitutional autonomy right not to engage in certain conduct, and the government conditions the benefit on the
person not exercising that right. Sometimes courts declare such
conditions unconstitutional, but sometimes they do not. The essential critique is that there is no coherent theory for explaining
when courts should declare such conditions unconstitutional.170
But the following proves that the contrived-threat test does provide a coherent theory of which conditions violate the constitutional right not to engage in that conduct.
All persons necessarily prefer unconditioned benefits over
both conditioned benefits and no benefits. Persons who take
conditioned benefits must also prefer them to no benefits, and
thus for them Unconditioned Benefits > Conditioned Benefits >
No Benefits. Persons who reject conditioned benefits must find
them worse than no benefits, and thus for them Unconditioned
Benefits > No Benefits > Conditioned Benefits.
The government threatens no benefits unless persons accept
the conditioned benefits. There are two possibilities depending
on whether, if conditioned benefits could not be offered, the government would prefer to provide the benefits or not.
a) Uncontrived warning. If the government prefers Conditioned Benefits > No Benefits > Unconditioned Benefits, then
threats to provide no benefits are uncontrived warnings because
if constitutional law did not allow the conditioned benefits, then
the government would provide no benefits. Uncontrived warnings that benefits will be denied to those who reject the condition thus impose no penalty relative to the but-for world; they
instead add a conditioned-benefits option that some persons prefer to the but-for option of no benefits. To be sure, some persons
would be even happier with unconditioned benefits, but that is
not what they would get if the conditioned benefits were unconstitutional. Prohibiting the conditioned benefits would be bad for
both the government and persons who would accept the condition, because they both must prefer conditioned benefits to no
benefits. Prohibiting the conditioned benefits would not affect
170

See notes 3–7 and accompanying text.
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persons who would reject the condition, because they would get
no benefits either way. Allowing the conditioned benefits would
thus make the government and some persons better off without
making any persons worse off.
b) Contrived threat. If the government instead prefers
Conditioned Benefits > Unconditioned Benefits > No Benefits,
then threats to deny benefits to persons who do not accept conditioned benefits are contrived because if constitutional law does
not allow the conditioned benefits, then the government would
provide unconditioned benefits. Such contrived threats penalize
decisions to reject the condition by denying unconditioned benefits that would have been given in the but-for world. Making a
contrived threat thus has precisely the same effect as imposing a
fine on those who exercise the constitutional right contrary to
how the government wishes.
For persons who reject the condition, the contrived threat
means they will get no benefits, rather than the unconditioned
benefits they would have received without the threat. This effect
makes these persons and the government worse off because they
both prefer unconditioned benefits to no benefits.
For persons who accept the condition, the contrived threat
means they will get conditioned benefits rather than unconditioned benefits. This makes these persons worse off because they
prefer unconditioned benefits. But it makes the government better off because it prefers conditioned benefits to the unconditioned benefits it otherwise would have given. The benefits are
the same either way. The only difference is that, with the threat,
the constitutional right would be exercised how the government
wishes; whereas, without the threat, the constitutional right
would instead be exercised how the person wishes. But the existence of the constitutional autonomy right by definition means
that the Constitution embodies the normative principle that the
right should be exercised how the person prefers, unless the person receives benefits that he is willing to exchange for those
rights. Adding a contrived threat converts the situation so that,
without any difference in benefits received, the right is now exercised how the government prefers instead. The government
has basically taken over the autonomy right without providing
any offsetting benefits. The effect is identical to the effect that
imposing a fine has on those persons who comply and thus do not
pay the fine. Given the premise of the constitutional autonomy
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right, the harm to these persons by definition exceeds the gain
to the government.
In other words, contrived threats force persons who accept
the condition to give up their constitutional rights in exchange
for nothing, because they get the same benefits they would have
gotten in the but-for world where conditioned benefits were not
possible. That necessarily violates the posited constitutional
right. Indeed, the contrived threat harms all persons whether or
not they accept the condition. Because the government conditioned the benefits, it must find the policy gain from individuals
who accept the condition greater than the policy harm from
denying benefits to individuals who reject the condition, but that
policy gain is unconstitutional by premise and thus illegitimate.
The above argument depends on the existence of a constitutional autonomy right, like the state right not to administer federal programs that was at issue in NFIB171 or the individual constitutional rights at issue in unconstitutional-conditions case law.
The same analysis would not apply if there were no constitutional
autonomy right, but instead only a claim that the federal government was exceeding its Commerce Clause power. For example,
suppose that Congress attached to federal spending or tax exemptions a contrived threat to deny those benefits to individuals that
do X, that individuals have no constitutional autonomy right not
to be compelled to do X, but that compelling X lies beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power. In that case, the contrived nature of the threat means it is coercive—that is, regulatory—but
there is no constitutional autonomy right to be free of such regulation. In these cases, the question is instead whether regulatory
uses of the federal spending and tax powers should be limited to
the scope of the Commerce Clause power. In a system that gives
Congress multiple overlapping enumerated powers, it is not at
all clear why they should be. Indeed, NFIB itself held the contrary, sustaining a regulatory use of the taxing power to penalize the nonpurchase of health insurance even though the Court
struck down a mandate to buy health insurance as beyond the
Commerce Clause.172 Consistent with this analysis, courts have
not struck down contrived threats to deny benefits when the affected conduct is not protected by any constitutional autonomy

171
172

NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2601–02 (Roberts, joined by Breyer and Kagan) (plurality).
Id at 2594–2600 (Roberts).
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right, but instead simply lies beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause power.
c) Conclusion. Accordingly, conditioning benefits on the
waiver of constitutional autonomy rights violates those rights
whenever the threat to deny benefits is contrived. Such conditions do not violate those rights whenever the threat to deny
benefits is uncontrived. Conditioning benefits reflects a contrived threat only when, if unable to make such a threat, the
government would still provide the benefits.
To put it another way, the contrived-threat test asks: In a
but-for world where the condition could not have been adopted,
what would the government have done? If the government would
have offered the benefit in the but-for world, then denying the
benefit imposes a penalty relative to that but-for world, and thus
the condition unconstitutionally penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right. If the government would not have offered the
benefit in the but-for world, then denying the benefit imposes no
such penalty and thus does not violate the recipient’s constitutional right.
This analysis shows the error in the general claim that the
greater power includes the lesser. When threats are contrived,
the greater power to withhold benefits entirely would not be exercised if the supposedly lesser power to condition benefits did
not exist. In such cases, the power to condition benefits is not
lesser at all because it enables the government to achieve effects
that it would not achieve with the supposedly greater power.
Nothing in the above proof requires relying on a contract
analogy or on whether benefits were provided in the past. Indeed, as we shall see, the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine
fully applies to contrived threats to deny new benefits. The relevant baseline entitlements are set by the Constitution, not by
the past provision of benefits. However, one could properly deem
those constitutional rights to be part of the initial contract between the government and its states and citizens. Further, regardless of whether one characterizes the initial set of constitutional entitlements as contractual, courts rely on contract
principles to explain why that initial set of constitutional entitlements can sometimes be waived (that is, modified) in exchange for government benefits. It thus makes sense to conclude
that the same contract principles that allow some such modifications also limit others, so that the limits on contrived threats
that induce agreements to modify initial contractual rights also
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apply to contrived threats that induce agreements to modify initial constitutional rights. Accordingly, while not required for the
proof, the contract analogy provides legal grounds for the same
conclusions as that proof.
To illustrate the above points, consider the classic case of
Frost & Frost Trucking Co v Railroad Commission of California.173
California could legally ban truckers from its highways, but
truckers had (at the time of the case) a substantive due process
right not to be ordered to be common carriers.174 The Supreme
Court held that it was unconstitutional for a California statute
to condition highway access on truckers’ agreeing to be common
carriers.175 This holding has been critiqued because the truckers
preferred being common carriers to lacking highway access.176
But this critique wrongly assumes that, if unable to condition
the benefit, California would have denied highway access to
truckers. That seems implausible because trucking was highly
valuable to the state economy. California’s preference ranking
was surely instead Common Carrier Condition > Unconditioned
Trucker Access > No Trucker Access. Therefore, if California
could not impose the common carrier condition, California would
instead give truckers highway access without that condition.
The threat to deny truckers access was thus a contrived threat
that harmed truckers because they preferred unconditioned access to conditioned access. The Court thus correctly held the
statute unconstitutional.177
The threat in Frost was also entirely credible because the
statute committed to carry out the threat and enough truckers
complied that legislators had no incentive to repeal the statute.
This is generally the case with unconstitutional conditions, and
it illustrates both why contrived threats can be highly credible
and why immunizing credible threats would produce the wrong
result.
173

271 US 583 (1926).
Id at 592.
175 Id at 599.
176 See Adam B. Cox and Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions
Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J
Legal Analysis 61, 65 (2013).
177 Frost, 271 US at 599. Likewise, it is unconstitutional to condition the ability of
corporations to do business in a state on waiving their access to federal court. Terral v
Burke Construction Co, 257 US 529, 532–33 (1922). This holding is correct because, if
unable to adopt that condition, a state would surely prefer having corporations operate
in the state without the condition over having no corporations operate in the state. Thus,
the threat to withhold the right to operate was contrived.
174
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d) Avoiding analytical confusion. An important analytical benefit of the above analysis is that it carefully separates the
issue of whether withholding benefits coercively violates a constitutional autonomy right not to engage in certain conduct from
claims that (1) the threatened withholding is illegal, (2) the induced agreement is independently illegal even if uncoerced, or
(3) the induced agreement is legal even if coerced because there
is no relevant constitutional right to be free of government coercion. Past scholarship has found unconstitutional conditions intractable in part because the scholarship has often mixed up
these analytically separate issues.
For example, suppose that the government provided a $100
prize to the person who wrote the best essay arguing that the
next president should be Hillary Clinton. The threat to withhold
$100 seems uncontrived because the government would not provide the $100 if it could not attach the condition. Such a prize
certainly would (and should) be unconstitutional. Does that
mean the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine does properly
condemn uncontrived threats? No, because the reason that this
prize is unconstitutional is not that it coerces the prize recipient
into giving up her constitutional right of free speech. Instead, it
is because, even without coercion, such agreements violate equal
protection because they fund speech favoring one political party
over another, and they thus harm third parties even if they benefit the agreeing parties. To test this, suppose that the government instead equally funded political speech for both parties, as
it has done with presidential campaigns. Then there is no constitutional violation, because the funding is equal. For other examples, whether an uncoerced agreement is independently unconstitutional may be more difficult, but analytical clarity comes
from seeing that such conclusions must rest on grounds other
than coercion. Just as some private contracts are illegal as a
matter of public policy even if they are not produced by duress,
likewise some government-person agreements are independently
unconstitutional even if not produced by coercion. Analytical
clarity requires separating the issues.
e) Difficulties of proof. One might be concerned that it is
hard to determine whether a threat is contrived. But often, as in
Frost and the ACA cases, it is not that hard. Nor has this proved
an insuperable problem for contract law, which has to resolve
the same issue. Even when it is hard, a difficult factual question
beats a vacuous standard. Difficulties of proof are also a common
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issue in law. The possibility of adjudicative error creates overdeterrence and underdeterrence, and we have our usual legal
tools for dealing with this problem. Here, because determining
whether a threat is contrived will produce litigation costs and
adjudicative error that deter uncontrived warnings to some extent, it makes sense to limit this doctrine (like the contract doctrine) to cases in which underdeterrence concerns are significant
by also requiring evidence that carrying out the threat would
have left the victim significantly worse off.
No matter how difficult it may be for courts to figure out the
true facts, we cannot avoid the reality that some threats are actually contrived while other threats are not, and that the above
proof shows the effects are always harmful for the contrived
threats and beneficial for the uncontrived threats. This is important because it means that any legal test that one uses must
be judged by the extent to which it successfully deters contrived
threats while avoiding deterring uncontrived warnings. As we
shall see next, the legal tests used by the Supreme Court do fairly
well on this score.
2. The fit with case law.
Supreme Court standards on unconstitutional conditions
correlate, albeit imperfectly, with a contrived-threat test. The
application of those standards can be improved by clarifying
that, in ambiguous cases, the standards should be interpreted to
implement a contrived-threat test.
a) Threats to deny funds used for government-desired objectives to those who exercise constitutional rights without using
government funds. A series of cases draws the following distinction: Congress can deny funds to persons who use federal funds
for activities that Congress does not want to subsidize. But Congress cannot deny funds to persons who use federal funds only
for “activities Congress wants to subsidize” based on how those
persons exercise constitutional rights that are not federally
funded.178 Although the Court itself admits this “line is hardly
clear” or “self-evident,”179 a contrived-threat test helps define the
line.

178 Agency for International Development v Alliance for Open Society International,
Inc, 133 S Ct 2321, 2328–32 (2013) (“AID”) (collecting cases).
179 Id at 2328, 2330.
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Denying funds used for activities that Congress does not
want to subsidize is an uncontrived warning because, if unable
to impose that condition, Congress would not provide the funds,
given that by definition it does not want to subsidize the activities. Allowing this condition will thus make the persons that
want to accept it better off without harming anyone.
Denying funds used for activities that Congress does want
to subsidize is likely a contrived threat because, if unable to impose the condition, Congress would likely provide the funds because the funds are by definition being used for activities Congress wants to subsidize. The Court thus correctly prohibits such
threats, rejecting the contrary view that such threats are constitutional whenever the condition advances congressional objectives.180 The problem with this contrary view is that all it means
is that Congress prefers Conditioned Funds > Funding Activities
Congress Wants > No Funding. Thus, if unable to use the challenged condition, Congress would still fund the activities it
wants. Accordingly, its threat to instead cut off all funding is a
contrived threat that should be prohibited.
Consider Harris v McRae,181 which strongly suggested that
Congress could not threaten to withhold nonabortion Medicaid
funding from women who had abortions using nonfederal
funds.182 Critics have argued that this conclusion offers no sound
theory of whether the benefit of receiving nonabortion Medicaid
should be included in the transaction.183 But this critique assumes
that nonabortion Medicaid would have been withheld in the butfor world without the condition. In fact, the Court was right that
without the condition, Congress would prefer funding nonabortion
Medicaid to eliminating Medicaid, which is demonstrably what
Congress has actually chosen ever since Harris was decided. A
threat to deny all Medicaid funding to those who had privately
funded abortions would thus be contrived. Accordingly, no “benefit” of nonabortion Medicaid would be caused by the posited condition. Rather, such a condition would coercively threaten to
take a benefit that would exist without any condition.
This precedent further holds that, if the activities Congress
wants to subsidize can be separated from the exercise of constitutional rights without those federal funds, then Congress must
180
181
182
183

Id at 2328.
448 US 297 (1980).
Id at 317 n 19.
See, for example, Levinson, 111 Yale L J at 1345–47 (cited in note 6).
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allow such separation.184 Thus, Congress may not, by refusing to
allow a separation of funds, use an uncontrived warning to provide funds only for activities it wants as an excuse for a contrived
threat to withhold those funds because persons engaged in protected unfunded activities. That is, when separated funding is
possible and legislatively preferable to denying all funding, a refusal to provide separated funding would be a contrived threat.
For example, Rust v Sullivan185 involved federal funding for
family planning.186 The Court held that Congress could constitutionally deny those funds to organizations that used the funds to
counsel abortions, but only because Congress permitted those
organizations to separate their activities so that organizations
that provided abortion counseling could still get federal funding
for other family planning activities.187 The refusal to fund abortion counseling was an uncontrived warning because Congress
preferred not to fund such activities. But had Congress instead
refused to provide family planning funds to organizations that
used separate nonfederal funds to counsel abortions, then that
would have been a contrived threat because Congress did want
to fund family planning services other than abortions.
In contrast, in Agency for International Development v Alliance for Open Society International, Inc,188 the Court held that
federal funding to combat HIV/AIDS could not constitutionally
be denied to organizations that refused to oppose prostitution,
even though it could constitutionally be denied to organizations
that used those federal funds to advocate the legalization of
prostitution.189 The condition requiring that federal funds not be
used to advocate the legalization of prostitution was an uncontrived warning because Congress did not want to fund such advocacy. But the condition denying federal funds to organizations
that refused to oppose prostitution, even if they used those funds
to combat HIV/AIDS in ways other than advocating the legalization of prostitution, was a contrived threat because Congress did
want to fund efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in other ways and was
preventing the separation of such funding.190

184
185
186
187
188
189
190

AID, 133 S Ct at 2328–32.
500 US 173 (1991).
Id at 178–79.
Id at 196–97.
133 S Ct 2321 (2013).
Id at 2330–32.
See id.
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b) Penalties versus subsidies. The Supreme Court has held
that conditioning government benefits on persons giving up their
constitutional rights to travel, speak, or observe their Sabbath is
an unconstitutional penalty,191 but that conditioning benefits on
persons giving up their rights to strike or avoid mandatory home
visits is a constitutional subsidy.192 Critics have argued that
these two lines of cases are inconsistent.193 But whether they are
consistent depends on factual predictions of what the government would likely do if unable to adopt these conditions.
In the former line of cases, it is clear that, if left with a
choice between providing the benefits without the challenged
condition and not providing the benefits at all, the government
would choose to provide the benefits. Indeed, that is what has
happened. The threats to deny those benefits were thus contrived threats to impose penalties relative to the but-for world.
The validity of the latter line of cases turns on whether one
thinks that, if unable to adopt the challenged conditions, the
government would have preferred to withhold the benefits rather than provide them without those conditions. The Court
found that Congress adopted the no-strike condition because it
wanted to make sure food stamps were not used to fund strikes,194
and it concluded that New York adopted the home visit condition
because it wanted to make sure welfare benefits were being used
to advance the best interests of children.195 If the desire to avoid
such unwanted uses of federal funds were strong enough, then
(if the conditions were unavailable) Congress might well prefer
withholding these benefits to providing benefits without conditions that would prevent unwanted uses. If so, then the threats
to deny those benefits were uncontrived warnings, and the Court
was right that they did not impose penalties. The Court’s implicit factual predictions are not self-evidently wrong, and if they are
correct, the two lines of cases are normatively consistent. But
courts should clarify the penalty/subsidy distinction by explicitly
191 See Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 641–42 (1969) (addressing a condition affecting the freedom to travel); Speiser, 357 US at 528–29 (addressing a condition affecting the
freedom of speech); Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 US
136, 146 (1987) (addressing a condition affecting the right to observe Sabbath).
192 See Lyng v International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, UAW, 485 US 360, 373–74 (1988) (addressing a condition
affecting the right to strike); Wyman v James, 400 US 309, 326 (1971) (addressing a condition affecting the right to avoid mandatory home visits).
193 See, for example, Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1433–39 (cited in note 6).
194 International Union, 485 US at 370–71.
195 James, 400 US at 315–16, 318–19.
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interpreting those terms to be measured relative to what the government would have done without the challenged condition.
c) Nexus or germaneness. Another line of cases concerns
situations in which the government can deny a development
permit outright, but cannot directly take some of the owner’s
property rights without just compensation. The government
threatens to deny the permit unless the owner agrees to a condition that exacts some of its property rights, such as requiring
the owner to give an easement to the public. The Supreme Court
has held that such threats are constitutional only if the condition’s purpose has an “essential nexus” to whatever purpose
would be served by withholding the permit.196 The Court has
stressed that this doctrine is just a “special application” of the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.197 More generally, the pattern of the Court’s results on unconstitutional conditions indicates
that the Court is more willing to uphold a condition that is “germane” to any government reasons for withholding the benefit.198
If a nexus or germaneness exists between the condition and
the withholding of the benefit, then a government that cannot use
the condition would be more likely to advance the same purpose
by withholding the benefit. Offering an unconditioned benefit
would be less likely in the no-condition world because that would
not serve the same purpose. Accordingly, a nexus or germaneness
indicates that threats to withhold benefits are likely uncontrived
warnings that should make the condition constitutional.
If no nexus or germaneness exists between the condition and
the withholding of the benefit, then an inability to use the condition would be less likely to cause the government to withhold the
benefit, because the two serve different purposes. Offering an unconditioned benefit would be more likely in the no-condition world
because giving the benefit would serve the same purpose as the
benefit that would be given in a conditioned benefit. (For example, providing a conditioned permit and providing an unconditioned permit both supply whatever policy gains flow from real estate development.) Thus, a lack of nexus or germaneness

196 Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 386 (1994); Nollan v California Coastal
Commission, 483 US 825, 837 (1987).
197 Koontz v St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S Ct 2586, 2594 (2013).
198 Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1458–68 (cited in note 6) (summarizing cases).
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indicates that threats to withhold benefits are likely contrived
threats that should make the condition unconstitutional.199
However, even if the condition and the denial of a permit
further very different purposes, the government may value
those different purposes equally, in which case different purposes need not suggest a contrived threat. For example, Nollan
v California Coastal Commission200 found no nexus between the
purpose of the condition (providing public access to the beach)
and the purpose of denying the permit (protecting visual access
to the ocean).201 Although those purposes are different, the government might value them the same and thus value denying
the permit similarly to providing a conditioned permit. If so,
then holding such conditioned permits unconstitutional will
prevent uncontrived warnings and result in the permits being
denied outright.202 This is by definition worse for the property
owner and the government, because both prefer the conditioned
permit to no permit. We can thus improve the doctrine by interpreting nexus and germaneness to mean a similar government
valuation of the condition and denial that is likely to make the
threat uncontrived.
Contrived-threat theory can also illuminate other features
of the doctrine used to determine when conditioned permits are
unconstitutional takings. In addition to imposing a nexus requirement, the case law has stressed that there must be some
“rough proportionality” between the condition and the social
costs imposed by granting the permit.203 The explanation for this
proportionality element under contrived-threat theory parallels
the explanation for the contract doctrine that makes the fairness
of a modification relevant to judging whether a threat used to
induce that modification is enforceable.204 The existence of a
199 Some argue that any ban on conditioned permits without the needed nexus could
easily be evaded by using eminent domain to take the easement and then giving the
permit as just compensation. See, for example, Levinson, 111 Yale L J at 1349 (cited in
note 6). But if the threat to deny the permit were contrived, then the permit would have
been given in the but-for world, and thus giving the permit would provide no compensation at all. Giving the permit would provide compensation only if the threat were uncontrived, in which case the conditioned permit would be constitutional anyway.
200 483 US 825 (1987).
201 Id at 836–37.
202 See William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 346
(Harvard 1995) (suggesting that the nexus doctrine may often result in permit denials
that are worse than the conditioned permits that would otherwise be negotiated).
203 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2595; Dolan, 512 US at 391.
204 See Part I.D.3.
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nexus may show that a threat to deny a permit is uncontrived in
the sense that the government would truly prefer no development to an unconditioned development. However, a threat to
deny a permit unless an unreasonably onerous condition were
accepted could still be contrived, because a more reasonable
condition would have sufficed to make granting the permit preferable to denying it. This provides clearer guidance on what
proportionality means: it means the condition should not exceed
the minimum necessary for the government to be willing to
grant the permit.
Other issues raised in the recent Koontz v St. Johns River
Water Management District205 decision can also be readily explained in terms of contrived-threat theory. First, Koontz made
clear that threats that violated the nexus-proportionality test
were unconstitutional even if the threatened party refused to accept the condition and thus the threatened permit denial was
carried out.206 This fits contrived-threat theory because contrived
threats are undesirable whether or not they are carried out, and
the parallel contract doctrine prohibits them even when they do
not induce modifications.207 Second, although the Koontz majority did not resolve the issue of how concrete the demand for a
condition must be for it to be unconstitutional,208 the dissent by
Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, discussed that issue at
length.209 And although framed as an inquiry into the definiteness of the demand, the dissent’s reasoning indicated that the
ultimate basis for the dissent’s conclusion was not the Government’s wording, but rather was what the dissent saw as a lack of
evidence that the Government would have granted the permit if
it could not attach the condition.210 Again, this fits contrived205

133 S Ct 2586 (2013).
Id at 2595–97.
207 See Part I.C (explaining why contrived threats are undesirable whether or not
they are carried out); Part I.B (discussing the Wolf case, which condemned an improper
threat even though it did not induce a modification).
208 Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2598.
209 Id at 2609–11 (Kagan dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor).
210 The dissent summarized its analysis of this issue by saying that “[t]he District’s
only hard-and-fast requirement was that Koontz do something—anything—to satisfy the
relevant permitting criteria” and that if the District were not permitted to make the
statements that it made, “the District would opt to simply deny permits outright.” Id at
2611 (Kagan dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor). This reasoning indicates that the dissent concluded that the Government was simply providing an uncontrived warning.
206
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threat theory. If a threat is contrived, the fact that it might be
phrased in equivocal or pleasant ways does not alter the undesirability of the threat. Third, Koontz held that monetary conditions could violate the doctrine, distinguishing them from taxes
on the ground that the monetary conditions were imposed on
particular pieces of property.211 Given that taxes are undeniably
coercive, the difference is not that taxes are less coercive than
such monetary exactions. The difference is that while there is no
constitutional autonomy right to be free of general taxes, there
is, in the Court’s view, a constitutional autonomy right against
selecting a particular person’s property for uncompensated takings.212 Thus, the coercive nature of the threatened monetary exaction affects the constitutional result only when that exaction
is selectively imposed on a particular person and thus affects a
constitutional autonomy right.
d) Plea bargaining. In a plea bargaining agreement, a
prosecutor threatens to bring criminal charges unless the defendant agrees to a certain sentence. The prosecutor thus offers
a benefit (nonprosecution) in exchange for the defendant’s waiver of constitutional rights. Some argue that plea bargains are
coerced by the threat of imprisonment.213 But plea bargains are
usually enforced. The reason is that, although the threat of
prosecution may leave the defendant with no reasonable alternative to agreeing to the plea bargain, duress exists only if the
threat is also improper, which the threat of prosecution ordinarily is not.
How can we determine which threats of prosecution are improper? By determining whether the threats are contrived. If the
prosecutor is threatening to bring the same charges she would
have brought if no plea bargain were possible, then she is simply
offering an uncontrived warning. This does not penalize the
criminal for exercising his constitutional rights, because he
would have faced the same charges even in the no-threat world.

211

Id at 2598–2602.
See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2599 (distinguishing Eastern Enterprises v Apfel, 524 US
498 (1998), because the monetary obligation there was imposed generally rather than on
a particular piece of property). See also Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2608 (Kagan dissenting,
joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) (acknowledging that Dolan v City of Tigard,
512 US 374 (1994), and various state doctrines suggest a distinction between general
legislative fees and fees that are selectively imposed on individual properties).
213 See, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
Cal L Rev 652, 695–703 (1981); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U
Chi L Rev 3, 12–19 (1978).
212
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In this case, offering a plea bargain can only make the defendant better off, by giving him the option of agreeing to a sentence
he finds less harmful than the expected harm from prosecution
in the no-threat world.
In contrast, suppose the prosecutor is overcharging—that is,
threatening to bring charges she would not have brought in the
no-threat world—in order to coerce a plea bargain. Then the
prosecutor is making a contrived threat that does penalize the
defendant for exercising his constitutional rights, because he
would not have faced the same charges in the no-threat world.
Accordingly, plea bargains produced by such contrived threats
should be unenforceable.
Because there is usually no observable non–plea bargain
baseline, it is generally difficult to determine whether prosecutors have overcharged in order to induce plea bargains. However, sometimes there is relevant evidence on that baseline. For
example, suppose that a prosecutor initially indicated an intent
to bring only certain charges but then, after the defendant refused to plead guilty, added more charges. The Supreme Court
has indicated that such a clearly contrived threat likely violates
due process.214 But when prosecutors indicate their intent to
bring certain charges before the plea negotiations begin, the
Court has found that there is insufficient evidence to show a
contrived threat that violates due process.215 Still, if concrete evidence did exist that the prosecutor’s initial charges were deliberately excessive in order to coerce plea bargains, that should
suffice to show a due process violation.216
214

See Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 360–61 (1978):

While the prosecutor did not actually obtain the recidivist indictment until after the plea conferences had ended, his intention to do so was clearly expressed
at the outset of the plea negotiations. . . . This is not a situation, therefore,
where the prosecutor without notice brought an additional and more serious
charge after plea negotiations relating only to the original indictment had ended with the defendant’s insistence on pleading not guilty. As a practical matter,
in short, this case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes as
a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to drop that charge
as part of the plea bargain.
(citation omitted).
215 See id.
216 Although Professor Albert W. Alschuler believes that whether a threat is coercive
should be based on a normative rather than predictive baseline, see Albert W. Alschuler,
Constraint and Confession, 74 Denver U L Rev 957, 967–69 (1997), he has recently argued that the sentences imposed at trial are systematically greater than those that
would be imposed in a system without plea bargaining. See Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler
and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 Duquesne L Rev 673, 698–99,
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3. Comparing other proposed tests.
Illustrious scholars have advocated many other tests for dealing with unconstitutional conditions. However, their tests all either underinclusively allow some contrived threats or overinclusively condemn some uncontrived warnings. Further, when
their tests produce results that overlap with the conclusions of
a contrived-threat test, my analysis contributes a consequentialist
proof in favor of those conclusions that has heretofore been lacking.
Kathleen Sullivan argues that courts should focus on the
distributive effects of conditioned benefits.217 Such distributive
effects may well show that the selective denial or grant of benefits violates equal protection or the constitutional rights of third
parties. But if so, then either the threatened denial of benefits or
the agreements granting benefits are themselves unconstitutional regardless of any coercion. Professor Cass Sunstein makes
a similar argument, but he recognizes that it amounts to abandoning the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.218 Their analyses
thus cannot explain the puzzle of why conditions are sometimes
held unconstitutionally coercive even when the threatened denial of benefits and the agreement to grant benefits are both lawful. Further, when both are lawful, their tests would immunize
all conditioned benefits, which would incorrectly allow contrived
threats that penalize the exercise of constitutional rights.
Professor Philip Hamburger argues that all conditioned
benefits should be unconstitutional whenever the condition
waives a constitutional right.219 But his test cannot explain the
702 (2013). However, he acknowledges that some scholars and justices have reached a
contrary empirical conclusion on the latter point. Id at 687–91, 702. My Article does not
purport to resolve this empirical debate, but if the Supreme Court were persuaded that
Alschuler’s position is empirically correct, then my Article would indicate that plea bargaining should, under the Supreme Court’s own precedent, be banned generally, rather
than policed with the case-by-case standard that is now used.
217 Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1421 (cited in note 6).
218 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 BU L Rev
593, 594–95, 608 (1990). Sunstein recommends abandoning the doctrine for two reasons.
First, he rejects what he assumes are the only possible baselines to determine when conditions are a penalty or subsidy: (a) what the government could do, (b) the common law,
or (c) a historical status quo baseline. Id at 597–604. He is right to reject those tests, but
he does not consider a predictive standard that asks what the government would do if it
could not condition the benefit. Second, he notes that penalizing constitutional rights is
not always unconstitutional. Id at 603. But when that is so, direct coercion is permissible, and thus a key premise for the doctrine is not met.
219 Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98
Va L Rev 479, 480–81 (2012).
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puzzle of why courts often hold precisely the opposite. His test
would also incorrectly condemn all uncontrived warnings, which
would harm both the government and the persons with the constitutional rights in question.
Professor Richard Epstein argues that current constitutional
law deviates from ideal constitutional law by weakly protecting
contract and property rights and allowing government redistribution of wealth.220 To move us closer to his ideal, he argues that
conditioning benefits should be (a) unconstitutional when his
ideal constitution would not allow denial of the benefit (like preventing businesses from operating), but (b) constitutional when
his ideal constitution would not allow providing the benefit (like
providing food stamps).221 One obvious problem is that one might
disagree with his ideal constitution. But the problem is deeper:
his approach would actually move us further from his own ideal.
When the threat is to deny one of his ideally required benefits,
Epstein and I would both condemn contrived threats but he
would also condemn uncontrived warnings, thus resulting in precisely the denials that he fears, as well as preventing governmentperson bargains that would make them both better off. When
the threat is to deny one of his ideally prohibited benefits, he
and I would both allow uncontrived warnings but he would also
allow contrived threats, thus allowing the government to use its
ideally prohibited power to penalize the exercise of constitutional rights that Epstein himself deems ideal.
Professor Mitchell Berman argues that threatening to deny
benefits should be presumptively unconstitutional if the purpose
of carrying out the threat would be to make it more costly to exercise a constitutional choice.222 Unfortunately, purpose is a
murky test, especially because different legislators have different purposes, and Berman stresses that his purpose test deviates from a pure predictive test like mine.223 Nor does he define
the grounds for rebutting his presumption. Whenever his test
produces conclusions that deviate from a contrived-threat test,
his test will either undesirably allow contrived threats or undesirably prohibit uncontrived warnings.

220 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and
the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988).
221 Id at 27–104.
222 Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 Georgetown L J 1, 7, 46 (2001).
223 Id at 46.
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Professor Kenneth Simons would deviate from a predictive
baseline when the government plausibly believes the condition
is relevant to the legitimate purposes of the government program.224 But such deviations would undesirably allow a contrived threat that penalizes the exercise of constitutional rights
whenever the condition has some relevance but that relevance is
not important enough to mean the benefit would be denied without that condition. As Simons acknowledges, his conclusion conflicts with case law prohibiting the government from conditioning benefits on working during the Sabbath.225 He argues that,
without his related-purpose exception, the government could not
limit political campaigning by public employees.226 But while
such limits do seem permissible, the reason is not that they are
uncoercive, but rather that the constitutional interest of undistorted politics justifies compelling public employees not to
campaign, making coercion irrelevant.
Professor Seth Kreimer proposes a mix of historical, equality, and predictive baselines to judge whether threats to withhold
benefits are unconstitutionally coercive.227 However, whenever
his historical or equality baselines allow conditions that a predictive baseline would condemn, his test wrongly allows contrived threats that penalize the exercise of constitutional rights.
Whenever his historical or normative baselines condemn conditions that a predictive baseline would allow, his test wrongly
condemns uncontrived warnings that would benefit both the
government and persons with the constitutional right.
True, Kreimer’s historical baseline is relevant to the correct
test because the past government conferral of unconditioned
benefits helps suggest that the government would have likely
continued to confer the benefit if it could not add the condition.
However, government policy does change over time, and the historical baseline should be rejected whenever there is evidence
that it does not accurately predict what the government would
have done without the condition. Kreimer argues otherwise because persons rely on prior benefits.228 But when the historical test
deviates from the predictive test, it will be when the historical test
224 Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 San
Diego L Rev 289, 291–92, 318–20, 323 (1989).
225 Id at 323.
226 See id at 319–20.
227 Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293, 1359–78 (1984).
228 Id at 1362.
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either (1) allows undesirable contrived threats to withhold a new
benefit, for which reliance is irrelevant, or (2) condemns desirable uncontrived warnings about the future denial of old benefits,
in which case his test would produce a denial of old benefits that
affirmatively harms reliance interests.
Likewise, Kreimer’s equality baseline is relevant to the correct test because government conferral of a benefit on all the
persons who accept the condition may suggest a purpose for doing so that would likely extend to everyone if the government
could not adopt the condition. However, to accurately judge
whether the condition unlawfully coerces the threat recipient,
this equality baseline should be rejected when it deviates from
the predictive baseline. After all, when there is such a deviation,
the equality baseline will either (1) allow contrived threats to
withhold benefits that others do not get, which penalizes the
constitutional autonomy right, or (2) condemn uncontrived
warnings about the coming denial of benefits that others do get,
in which case his test would produce a denial of benefits that
harms everyone.
III. THREATS THAT INDUCE NEW PRIVATE CONTRACTS
A contract is obviously unenforceable if the terms are independently illegal or if the contract was induced by threats of
illegal conduct.229 But threats of otherwise-lawful action to induce an otherwise-lawful new contract can also constitute duress when the threat is improper and the victim has no reasonable choice.230 This Part shows that such threats are and should
be deemed “improper” only when they are contrived.
A.

Threats to Exercise Unrelated Rights

Even if a party has every legal right to terminate a contract,
a threat to do so “for some purpose unrelated to the contract,
such as to induce the recipient to make an entirely separate contract, is ordinarily improper.”231 Such facts indicate that the
threatener had no reason not to continue performing the first
contract and thus would have performed it if unable to communicate a threat designed to induce the separate contract.
Such a threat is thus contrived.
229
230
231

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 176–78 (1981).
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 175–76 (1981).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment e & illustrations 9, 11 (1981).
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The same can be true when a party threatens not to enter
one contract in order to induce another. In one case, a lessor said
it would rent to the purchaser of a leaving tenant’s business, but
the lessor then threatened not to do so unless the leaving tenant
forked over 45 percent of his business-sale proceeds.232 This
threat was held improper, which thus invalidated the new contract to pay 45 percent of the business-sale proceeds.233 This fits
the contrived-threat test because the lessor had clearly indicated
it was happy to rent to the new tenant and threatened otherwise
only to extort part of the business-sale proceeds.
In short, if a party threatens to exercise unrelated rights to
induce a new contract, such threats are improper when the
threat is contrived—that is, when the party would not exercise
the unrelated rights in that way but for the ability to communicate the threat. Such contrived threats impose penalties that the
victim would not have incurred in the no-threat world. Because
the threat of such penalties can induce the victim to agree to
terms on the new contract that are not in his interest, the threat
eliminates the normal assurance that the new contract allocates
resources to the highest-value user. Thus, such contracts are
properly held unenforceable.
If, instead, the threat were to exercise unrelated rights in a
way that would be in the interests of the threatener even if no
new contract could be induced, then the threat would be an uncontrived warning. Because the unrelated rights would be exercised in an adverse way in the no-threat world, the new contract
must make the threat recipient better off because he prefers the
new contract terms to having the unrelated rights exercised adversely. Thus, in such cases, the new contracts are properly held
enforceable.
B.

Threats Not to Enter into the Challenged New Contract
1. Threats to withhold desired goods unless the market
price is paid.

The typical threat that induces a new contract is a threat
to withhold goods unless the market price is paid. Some argue
that all such threats are coercive because individuals have no

232 See Wolf, 154 A2d at 630, citing Hochman v Zigler’s Inc, 50 A2d 97, 100 (NJ
Chanc 1946).
233 Wolf, 154 A2d at 630.
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reasonable choice but to pay to get the goods that they need to
live.234 However, if the seller could not sell to the individual at
the market price, then the seller would withhold the good because it would prefer to sell to someone else for the market price.
The threat to withhold the good is thus an uncontrived warning.
If duress law made the contract unenforceable, this individual
would thus not get the good that he needed. (Of course, if price
regulations generally required a lower price, then some individuals would get the good, but recall our premise is that the terms
of the contract are not independently illegal.) This conclusion is
true even if the seller is a monopolist, because then the market
price is the monopoly price, and the seller would prefer to sell to
someone else at the monopoly price rather than sell to any particular individual at a submonopoly price. Thus, refusals to sell
for less than the market price are enforceable no matter how
much the buyer needs the good.235
Batsakis v Demotsis236 shows that this point holds even in
extreme cases. In war-torn Greece in 1942, Demotsis borrowed
500,000 drachmae (worth about $25) in exchange for a promise
to later pay $2,000 after the war.237 The court held that this
agreement was enforceable.238 Because the war-torn circumstances doubtless made Demotsis desperate for the money, critics have argued that her promise was extracted under duress.239
But those same war-torn circumstances also likely made having
cash highly valuable and lending money highly risky, and no evidence was offered that the high rate charged differed from the
going market price. Thus, if Batsakis did not believe the contract would be enforceable, he likely would not have lent the
money to Demotsis, which would have made her even worse off
given her apparent desperate need for money. Because the
threat to withhold the money unless promised $2,000 was thus
an uncontrived warning, the contract was properly held enforceable. Moreover, assuming that the high market rate reflected
the desperate need of persons in war-torn Greece for cash, we
want such high rates to be enforceable in order to encourage

234

See, for example, Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1446–47 (cited in note 6).
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment f, illustration 14 (1981);
Standard Box Co v Mutual Biscuit Co, 103 P 938, 943–44 (Cal App 1909).
236 226 SW2d 673 (Tex Civ App 1949).
237 Id at 673–74.
238 Id at 675.
239 Fried, Contract as Promise at 109–11 (cited in note 99).
235
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others to increase the supply of cash to war-torn Greece to meet
that need.
2. Threats to withhold desired goods when parties have
been cut off from the market.
Sometimes parties might be cut off from the market, so that
the market does not provide an effective constraint. If the buyer
has been cut off, a seller might threaten not to sell a product unless the seller receives an above-market price. If the seller has
been cut off, the buyer might threaten not to buy unless the
buyer receives a below-market price. When should such threats
be deemed contrived?
First, consider cases in which a seller has taken steps to cut
the buyer off from the market in order to try to charge the buyer
an above-market price. Then a threat not to sell at less than an
above-market price is clearly contrived because, if that threat
could not be made, then the seller would be willing to sell to the
buyer at the market price and would not have taken steps to cut
off the buyer to begin with. For example, if a seller misleads a
buyer into thinking that the seller will supply a good at the
market price, and thus causes the buyer to forgo other options
until it is too late, then a threat not to sell unless an abovemarket price is paid is contrived and a contract at that abovemarket price is unenforceable.240
Now suppose that a seller, through no productive effort,
stumbles upon a buyer who has been cut off from the market for
adventitious reasons. For example, suppose that Bill Gates shows
up at the emergency room needing immediate lifesaving treatment, and the doctor says she will not treat him unless he promises to pay her $1 billion. In this case, the doctor’s threat is contrived because if that threat were not possible, the doctor would
be willing to treat Bill Gates at the doctor’s usual market rate.
Thus, Bill Gates’s agreement to pay $1 billion is unenforceable.241
If, in the adventitious case, there is no clear market rate, an
alternative price baseline might still show that the seller made a
contrived threat. This point is illustrated by Post v Jones.242 In
240 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2)(b) & comment f, illustration
13 (1981).
241 See Steven Shavell, Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J Legal Stud
325, 338 (2007) (noting that courts hold adventitious holdup contracts to be unenforceable
when they are substantially above market prices).
242 60 US (19 How) 150 (1856).
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1849, three whaling ships happened to find another whaling
ship stranded on rocks in the Arctic right before winter and
agreed to buy the stranded ship’s whale oil for a very low
price.243 Although the whale oil was nominally “auctioned,” the
stranded ship had more oil than the three ships could take, so
they had no need to compete with each other on price.244 The Supreme Court recognized that even when salvage is an “absolute
necessity,” parties can set salvage prices by contract when the
stranded ship has access to “a market and competition.”245 However, the Court held that this contract was unenforceable for two
reasons. First, the stranded ship had no reasonable choice but to
take whatever the three ships offered, because “there was no market . . . [and] no competition.”246 Second, taking the whale oil at the
default price (which is set by salvage law when no binding contract exists) was still highly profitable because salvaging the oil
required little risk or effort and the opportunity costs of filling the
cargo space were low given that the whaling season was ending.247
The second finding in Post meant that the three ships’
threat not to take the oil at the default rate was a contrived
threat because, if they could not make that threat, they would
have happily salvaged the oil at the still highly profitable default rate. No salvaging was the wrong but-for baseline because
salvaging would have occurred in the no-threat world. Indeed, the
Court explicitly rejected the three ships’ claim that the stranded
ship was not harmed because it was better off than if no salvaging
had been provided.248 The effects of allowing salvagers to price below the default salvage price in such accidental-monopoly cases is
harmful because if ships know that rescues will cost them almost all the value of their cargo, then they will take excessive
precautions to avoid the need for rescue.249 In contrast, because
the default price was high enough to make salvage profitable,
and because finding the stranded ship was adventitious, using
the default price as the baseline for judging whether the threat
was contrived will not reduce any salvage effort. But this result
243

Id at 158–59.
Id at 159.
245 Id at 157–58. See also The Elfrida, 172 US 186, 196–97, 204 (1898) (stressing
that the law does not generally regulate the reasonableness of salvage prices and allowing a high contract price when the stranded ship had competitive salvage bids).
246 Post, 60 US (19 How) at 159.
247 Id at 160–61.
248 Id at 160.
249 See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 336 (Belknap 2004).
244
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depends critically on having some known, desirable price baseline to determine whether a contrived threat had been made.
Now suppose a seller earns being in a position to sell to a
buyer who is cut off from the market. For example, suppose that
the rescue ships were actually in the business of searching the
seas for stranded ships. If the default price provided by salvage
law suffices to compensate those search costs, then a threat to
withhold salvage unless paid more than that default price would
be contrived because, absent an ability to make that threat, the
rescue ships would have incurred the search costs and provided
salvage. If the default price provided by salvage law does not
suffice to compensate for those search costs, then a threat to
withhold salvage unless paid more than that default price would
be an uncontrived warning because, absent an ability to make
that threat, the rescue ships would not have incurred the search
costs and thus would not have been there to provide salvage.
This result could also be achieved by adjusting the default price
to compensate for efficient search costs.250
3. Bilateral negotiation to split extramarket surplus.
Suppose that neither party has been cut off from the market
but the seller’s goods are worth more to the buyer than to any other buyer. This is a frequent situation, often because of relationshipspecific investments. An employee who works at a firm may develop firm-specific skills that make the employee more valuable
to the firm than to any other firm. Or a business that rents a location may find at the time of renewal that the location is more
valuable to it than any other location is. In these cases, we have
a bilateral negotiation over how to split an extramarket surplus
because, although the buyer cannot find any other seller whose
goods it values as much, the seller also cannot find any other
buyer who values its goods as much. There will be a bargaining
range, with the minimum price the seller would take being the
market price other buyers would pay, and the maximum price
the buyer would pay being the higher value it puts on the goods.
The results of such bargaining are indeterminate.
In these cases of bilateral negotiations about the split of
extramarket surplus, the contrived-threat test is not helpful, because we have no baseline price to assess whether a contrived
threat has been made. One might think that a contract at any
250

See id at 335–36.
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price above the seller’s reservation price must reflect a contrived
threat because the seller would take the reservation price if it
were unable to insist on a higher price. However, it is also the
case that any price below the buyer’s reservation price must reflect a contrived threat by the buyer because the buyer would
take its reservation price if it were unable to insist on a lower
price. Such negotiations thus cannot help but reflect contrived
threats by both sides, and a contrived-threat test thus cannot
give either side a unique right to void the contract. Moreover,
both sides would be worse off if contracts between them were
unenforceable, because any contract between them leaves them
better off than a contract with others. Thus, contracts produced
by such bargaining are enforceable.251
C.

Blackmail

In the case of blackmail, the threat is to divulge information
to third parties unless the victim agrees to pay money. Blackmail law had long been regarded as “one of the most elusive intellectual puzzles in all of law.”252 Contrived-threat analysis
helps solve that puzzle by showing that all blackmail contracts
are necessarily produced by either contrived threats or uncontrived warnings and that each has distinctive harmful effects.
Contrived blackmail threats are coercive and cause inefficiency
between the contracting parties, without affecting the information revealed to third parties. Uncontrived blackmail threats
are uncoercive and benefit the contracting parties, but they prevent information disclosures to third parties whose interests often trump the interests of the contracting parties. To explain
blackmail law, we need to understand the combination of these
effects.

251 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment a (1981). One might think
that any price above the seller’s reservation price is undesirable because it discourages
the buyer (for example, a tenant) from making relationship-specific investments that
make the seller’s goods more valuable to the buyer. However, the seller might also make
relationship-specific investments that make its goods more valuable to the buyer. Moreover, if buyer investments of this sort are efficient, the seller can help pay for them. For
example, in commercial leases, sellers often give tenants improvement allowances to induce tenants to begin leases.
252 James Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U Pa L Rev 1975, 1975 (1993).
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1. Contrived blackmail threats are always coercive and
invalid.
First, consider cases in which divulging the relevant information “would not significantly benefit the party making the
threat.”253 Given that the act of revealing this information would
not significantly benefit the threatener, it is likely a contrived
threat. True, if divulging information is very cheap, one might
wonder whether the threatener would divulge the information in
the no-threat world for even insignificant benefits. But effort is
necessary to collect information and (even when acquired fortuitously) to document the information in a way that can be divulged such that it is sufficiently persuasive to be effective and
to overcome the risk of suits for libel or slander. A blackmailer
would not likely incur the costs of such effort for insignificant
benefits without the prospect of making blackmail threats.
Thus, any threat to divulge information is likely to be a contrived threat if divulging the information confers no significant
benefit to the threatener. Allowing such contrived blackmail
threats would harm the victim because in the no-threat world he
would not pay money and the information would still not be divulged. Because such contrived threats do not affect the revelation of information, preventing such blackmail would not affect
third parties. Finally, preventing such contrived blackmail
threats would reduce blackmailer efforts that would inefficiently
incur costs to induce nothing but an unproductive transfer of
wealth. Because these effects are always negative, contract law
correctly condemns all blackmail contracts that are induced by
such contrived threats, regardless of what sort of information is
at issue.254
2. Uncontrived blackmail threats benefit contracting
parties but harm third-party interests.
Now consider cases in which divulging information would
significantly benefit the threatener. For example, suppose the information were collected by an investigative reporter who would,
in the no-threat world, publish the information in an article. In
253 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2)(a) (1981). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176, comment f (1981) (“Clause (a) is concerned with cases in which a
party threatens to do an act that would not significantly benefit him but would harm the
other party. . . . A typical example is a threat to make public embarrassing information
concerning the recipient unless he makes a proposed contract.”).
254 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2)(a) (1981).
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that case, the threat to divulge the information is clearly an uncontrived warning.255 Accordingly, an agreement to suppress the
information is in the interests of both contracting parties, because the victim prefers paying the money to having the information divulged and the blackmailer prefers getting the money
to revealing the information. But this blackmail contract does
prevent a disclosure of information to third parties that otherwise would have occurred. Whether to invalidate blackmail contracts induced by uncontrived warnings thus turns on whether
third-party interests in the information trump the interests of the
contracting parties, which varies with the information at issue.
In particular, when the information concerns crimes, the
public obviously has a powerful interest in knowing the information because that helps deter crimes that harm the public.
Because the public interest in discovering crimes exceeds the interests of the contracting parties in concealing crimes, such
blackmail contracts are invalid even when uncoercive. Accordingly, contract law correctly condemns all blackmail about
crimes, whether or not divulging the information would confer a
significant benefit that would make the threat uncontrived.256
The reason is that all such blackmail about crimes necessarily
involves either (1) a contrived threat that creates inefficiency for
the contracting parties without affecting information disclosure
or (2) an uncontrived warning that suppresses the disclosure of
criminal information to third parties whose interests trump the
interests of the contracting parties.
When the information involves embarrassing noncriminal
information, third-party interests are weaker, and it is less clear
whether they outweigh the interests of the contracting parties.
In the investigative-reporter example, one might worry about
the harm to the reporter’s newspaper or its readership from
suppressing the information. On the other hand, one might regard third parties’ interests in salacious information as weak.
Such judgments vary by jurisdiction and court, as well as with
the specific information at issue. General contract law thus does
not condemn agreements that are induced by threats to divulge
embarrassing noncriminal information when divulging would
255 Some believe that the costs of collecting and revealing information are sometimes
so trivial that information would be revealed even without any significant benefit. To the
extent they are right, such threats are also uncontrived warnings and have the effects
described in this Section.
256 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(1)(b), (2)(a) & comments c, f (1981).
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significantly benefit the threatener (in other words, when it is
an uncontrived warning),257 leaving it to other bodies of law to
decide when such uncoercive contracts should be void on public
policy grounds.
Why, however, do some criminal blackmail statutes seem to
overinclusively condemn even uncontrived warnings about information with little legitimate third-party interest? Perhaps
partly because adjudicative errors in distinguishing between
contrived and uncontrived blackmail threats would create strong
underdeterrence concerns if such an exception were recognized.
Nor are blackmail statutes literally applied in certain cases.
Consider the fact that litigation usually ends in a settlement in
which someone receives money and agrees not to disclose information about the other party. Because such confidentiality has
value, it must have been paid for in the settlement, so this exchange literally fits broad definitions of blackmail. But no one
treats it that way. The analysis here explains why. Litigation
already provides copious incentives to collect and document the
information, so disclosure would likely be nearly costless. Further, litigants generally dislike each other, so disclosure would
likely produce serious psychic benefits. Thus, threats to divulge
the information collected in litigation are particularly likely to
be uncontrived. Adjudicative errors and underdeterrence are
thus less of a concern, and an implicit exception to blackmail
law is recognized. The analysis here thus helps explain not only
why blackmail prohibitions are so broad, but also why nonliteral
exceptions are sometimes recognized.
3. Prior literature.
Prior works on blackmail have tended to find it perplexing
because they focus either on the legality of the threatened act
rather than on the practical effects of the threats258 or on some of
those practical effects to the exclusion of others. Some articles
focus on protecting the interests of third parties in information,259 but they cannot explain the universal ban on contrived
blackmail threats, which do not affect third-party information.
Other works focus on the harm to victims and the inefficiency of
257

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(1)(b) & comment c (1981).
See, for example, Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 Monist
156, 156–58 (1980); Glanville L. Williams, Blackmail, 1954 Crim L Rev 79, 162–63.
259 See, for example, James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 Colum
L Rev 670, 672 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U Chi L Rev 553, 558 (1983).
258
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efforts to collect information with no productive gain,260 but they
cannot explain the ban on many uncontrived blackmail warnings,
through which the victim benefits, the information would be collected anyway, and the blackmail contract does alter the information revealed to third parties. Professor Scott Altman has offered what he calls a “patchwork” theory that combines many of
these effects.261 What contrived-threat analysis clarifies is the
deeper structure: that all blackmail must have one or the other
of these sets of effects and that only the combination can explain
the full scope and limits of blackmail law.
CONCLUSION
Contractual duress, unconstitutional conditions, and blackmail have been long-standing puzzles because the focus has
been on the wrong baseline: what the threatener should do or
legally could do. To resolve these puzzles, one must instead focus
on what the threatener would do absent the threat. Only contrived threats to take action that differs from this but-for action
can harm the threat recipient and be coercive. Uncontrived
warnings can only benefit the agreeing parties and thus should
be unlawful only when even an uncoerced agreement would be
unlawful, usually because the agreement harms third parties. A
contrived-threat test not only explains the actual pattern of case
law in a clearer fashion, but also provides a sound normative
justification for those results.
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